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ARTICLES
THE COOPERATIVE AND INTEGRATIVE MODELS
OF INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL COMITY: TWO
ILLUSTRATIONS USING TRANSNATIONAL
DISCOVERY AND BREARD SCENARIOS
Molly Warner Lien'
American courts often confront questions of international
judicial comity with a reticence that betrays timidity,
apprehension, and occasional hostility.' In the private law
context, many decisions do not reflect the role of our courts as
components in an informal global network of courts that resolve
transnational commercial, intellectual property, family law, and
+ Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. The
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their comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. Comity has been described in many ways. For example, Joseph Story
defined it as the "extent of the obligation of the laws of one nation within the
territories of another." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS
37 (1834). The Judiciary broadly framed the definition of comity. See, e.g.,
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) ("The extent to which the law of one
nation... whether by executive order, by legislative act, or by judicial decree,
shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation, depends
upon what our greatest jurists have been content to call 'the comity of
nations."'). The Court continued by describing comity as "the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts
of another nation...." Id. at 164; see also Philips Med. Sys. Int'l B.V. v.
Bruetman, 8 F.3d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Comity - the respect that sovereign
nations ... owe each other - is a traditional, although in the nature of things a
rather vague, consideration in the exercise of equitable discretion."); Howe v.
Goldcorp Invest., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 950 (1st Cir. 1991) (explaining that comity
should "help the world's legal systems work together, in harmony, rather than
at cross purposes"); Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d
435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971) ("A] nation's expression of understanding which
demonstrates due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the
rights of persons protected by its own laws."). Foreign courts have also had
difficulty fashioning precise definitions. See, e.g., British Airways Bd. v. Laker
Airways, Ltd., 3 All E.R. 375, 397 (C.A. 1983) ("Judicial comity Is shorthand for
good neighborliness, common courtesy and mutual respect between those who
labour in adjoining Judicial vineyards.").
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other types of disputes. 2 In the public law context, courts seize
on the dualist perspective of the United States to subordinate
the determinations and interpretations of international tribunals
in favor of domestic norms and practices.3  Both dualist and
2. Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1456,
1456 (1991) (indicating the growing importance of international civil litigation).
The amount of transnational litigation, of course, grows at a level
commensurate with the degree of globalization in trade. For an interesting
attempt at measuring the increases in globalization, see A.T. Kearney, Inc. and
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Measuring Globalization,
FOREIGN POL'Y, Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 56 [hereinafter Kearney]. In the article, the
authors survey fifty developed countries and selected emerging markets. Id.
They quantify globalization by measuring personal contact across borders,
international travel, international phone calls, cross border payments and
transfers, the movement of goods and the share of international trade in each
country's economy, the permeability of borders, and the level of inward and
outward directed foreign investment and portfolio capital flows. Id. at 56-57.
The United States ranked twelfth, behind Singapore, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, Finland, Ireland, Austria, the United Kingdom, Norway, Canada,
and Denmark. Id. at 58. In the area of economic activity linked to
communications and information technology, however, North America far
outpaced other countries. Id. at 60.
Globalization also Influences the litigation process. In the context of
commercial litigation, for example, Stephen Burbank has noted that cross
fertilization takes place when, "(1) doctrine and techniques developed in the
context of domestic cases are brought to bear on problems presented in
international litigation, and (2) the increasingly international dimensions of
litigation in our courts prompt changes in doctrine and techniques, which are
then applied in domestic cases." Burbank, supra, at 1459. Transnational
family law litigation is likewise on the rise, given the increasing opportunities
for citizens of most nations to travel and marry abroad. See, e.g., Diorinou v.
Mezitis, 247 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2001). The recent controversy involving an
Internet adoption dispute between an English and American couple is another
sad example. Damian Whitworth, Court Orders Return of Net Adoption Girls,
TIMES (London), Mar. 3, 2001, at 5.
3. The United States has consistently viewed the relationship of
international law and domestic law from a dualist perspective. Dualism refers
to the notion that international law is separate and distinct from domestic law,
and that it can be invoked in domestic courts only when it has been adopted or
otherwise transformed into domestic law, through enactment, recognition in a
judicial precedent, or through ratification of a treaty Incorporating the relevant
rule of international law. Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States
Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARv. L. REv.
853, 864 (1987). The opposite condition, known as "monism," regards
international law and domestic law as parts of a unitary legal system. Id.
Putting the distinction succinctly, "[flor one school, the dualists, municipal law
prevails in case of conflict: for the other school, the monists, international law
prevails." Edwin Borchard, The Relation Between International Law and
Municipal Law, 27 VA. L. REV. 137, 137 (1940). Although American courts often
state that "international law is part of our law," the dualist stance of American
law requires subordination of international norms to domestic ones in cases of
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monist practices reflect an unwillingness to extend judicial
comity.
Indeed, despite the frequent use of the term "comity," the
prevalent confusion over its scope has led some scholars to
regard comity as either dead or moribund, and to pen eloquent
and poetic eulogies to either celebrate or hasten its demise.4 The
principal critique is that courts have used "comity" to avoid
accurate analysis of legal issues. As Professor Michael Ramsey
wrote, "international comity" is an "expression of unexplained
authority, imprecise meaning, and uncertain application," and it
is a concept that is persistently misunderstood.5 More often
than not it is either misapplied or invoked to support a decision
in truth reached on the basis of federalism, separation of
powers, or other grounds.
Nevertheless, this article presents workable models of
international judicial comity that can and must be created. A
common definition of comity, a word derived from the simple
Sanskrit verb for "he smiles," is that it refers to the informal and
voluntary recognition that the courts of one nation accord to the
judicial decisions of another.6 This article proposes two models
of judicial comity. 7 These models accommodate the domestic
clear conflict. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 (1986).
The most prominent examples of dualist systems are nations with legal
systems based on a particular set of religious or political beliefs. States with
Islamic legal systems, for example, have great difficulty developing a theoretical
construct for harmonizing international and domestic law because of the belief
that all law, including international law, should follow Islamic principles. David
A. Westbrook, Islamic International Law and Public International Law: Separate
Expression of World Order, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 819, 859-84 (1993) (discussing and
critiquing this proposition).
4. See, e.g., Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARv. INT'L L. J.
1, 77 (1991) (arguing that comity operates outside the parameters of both
domestic and international law); Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping "International
Comity," 83 IOWA LAW REv. 893, 896-97 (1998) (arguing that comity should be
discarded since it is most frequently used to obscure analysis); Spencer Weber
Waller, The Twilight of Comity, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 563, 578-79 (2000)
(arguing that comity is an aspect of extraterritoriality that has been "fought to a
draw," and that these problems are better resolved at the level of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or other
international organizations).
5. Ramsey, supra note 4, at 893.
6. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 455 (1964).
7. The classic statement of comity, as defined in a legal sense by the
Supreme Court, is "the recognition which one nation allows within its territory
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law obligations of American courts, while simultaneously easing
the frustration of foreign and international tribunals over
perceived American intransigence and disregard for foreign and
international tribunals.
The first model, termed "cooperative comity," is a horizontal
construct that should be employed when courts face actual or
potential conflicts with foreign tribunals. The second model,
"integrative comity," is a vertical and more deferential construct,
which should shape responses to hierarchical conflicts between
American courts and international or supranational tribunals.
This article evaluates these models in the context of judicial
comity. The question of how the comity doctrine should be
applied in the legislative8 and executive9 contexts has been and
to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation ..... Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). Moreover, judicial comity is "the idea that
U.S. courts will under certain circumstances defer to the rulings of foreign
courts." Ramsey, supra note 4, 'at 897. Additionally, Professor Mark Janis
states that "[clomity ... is the foundation on which is built structures for the
recognition and enforcement by national courts of the judgments of foreign
courts and of the awards, of foreign arbitral tribunals." MARK JANIS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 331 (1999).
8. Examples of legislative comity revolve around the question of
applicability of U.S. laws to conduct occurring outside the jurisdiction. The
most frequent question in recent years concerns the increasingly limited scope
of legislative comity in the application of U.S. antitrust law to conduct occurring
outside of the United States. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509
U.S. 764, 767-70 (1993) (holding that the "principle of international comity does
not preclude district court jurisdiction over the foreign conduct alleged"); United
States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1997) (analyzing the
effect of the Sherman Act against a Japanese company). See generally Waller,
supra note 4. But see Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597,
615 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that a comity analysis is required before exercising
jurisdiction under the Sherman Act). A complicating factor in many attempts to
regulate foreign cartels under U.S. antitrust laws has been the United States
government's difficulty in securing the cooperation of foreign governments in
obtaining evidence against alleged conspirators. See Waller, supra note 4, at
573 (describing the difficulty the United States experienced while gathering
evidence against the foreign corporation DeBeers); see, e.g., United States v.
General Elec. Co., 869 F. Supp. 1285 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (challenging the world
diamond domination by DeBeers and General Electric).
A second area where the question of extraterritorial application of U.S. law
has arisen is in the context of employment relations. The United States
Supreme Court, for example, held that Title VII, prior to its amendment in
1991, did not apply to a claim by an American employee against an American
employer when the allegedly discriminatory conduct occurred in Saudi Arabia.
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 246-47 (1991) (interpreting
whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies extraterritorially to a
domestic employer employing United States citizens abroad); see also Foley
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will continue to be explored by others.
Part I of this article provides an overview of the general
confusion surrounding court-to-court comity in various
adjudicative contexts. Part II analyzes the application and focus
of cooperative judicial comity and suggests definitional and
operational solutions. The particular problem used to illustrate
the model of cooperative comity is the nettlesome question of
foreign litigants and their use of American courts to obtain
discovery that would be unobtainable abroad. In deciding what
assistance to give to litigants in foreign proceedings, American
courts can and should become more sensitive to the decisions
that other legal systems in general-and courts in particular-
have made about the availability and efficacy of discovery. Part
III focuses on the less frequently occurring problem of integrative
comity, which is implicated where domestic courts subordinate
the determinations, interpretations, and requests of
international tribunals to domestic law considerations. A more
developed understanding of the relationship of American courts
and international tribunals is necessary if we are to bridge the
chasm between American dualism and the monist construct of
international law.
Bros. v. Fflardo, 336 U.S. 281, 282 (1949) (presenting the question of "whether
the Eight Hour Law applies to a contract between the United States and a
private contractor for construction work in a foreign country"); Blackmer v.
United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932) (noting that legislation, unless
otherwise indicated, is not presumed to apply outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the Untied States).
In another context, the Ninth Circuit held that a foreign creditor may not
bring a foreign collection proceeding against a debtor who has obtained a
discharge via the U.S. bankruptcy laws. In re Simon, 153 F.3d 991, 994 (9th
Cir. 1998). In Simon, the discharge order contained an injunction against
prosecution of claims by creditors. Id. Although the court was careful to note
that the injunction did not reach the foreign courts, it did reach the foreign
creditor who had sought a declaratory judgment as to the permissibility of
further foreign proceedings. Id. at 997.
9. Examples of executive comity include the deference given to
determinations by the executive branch in imposing sanctions and
countermeasures. See, e.g., Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad)
Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (Supp. 11 1997) (empowering the executive branch
to impose sanctions on corporations who acquire property from the Cuban
government where the property was earlier expropriated from U.S. citizens).
See generally Harry L. Clark, Dealing with U.S. Extraterritorial Sanctions and
Foreign Countermeasures, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 61 (1999). One critic
argues that these uses of comity are not actual examples of comity, rather they
are allocations of foreign relations power to the executive branch. Ramsey,
supra note 4, at 913.
20011
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 50:591
I. THE CONFUSED CONTEXT OF JUDICIAL COMITY IN AMERICAN
COURTS
Any introduction to the proposed cooperative comity model
requires some analysis of the current doctrinal difficulties and
scholarly critiques of comity. Although there is disagreement
regarding the circumstances in which comity operates,
application of judicial comity occurs in a wide variety of
contexts, including the assertion of personal jurisdiction over
foreign defendants,' ° issues in interpreting forum selection
clauses," decisions about whether to abstain when the interests
10. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 115-16
(1987) (evaluating a court's assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
under domestic due process standards). In the realm of personal jurisdiction,
problems arise when American courts recognize jurisdiction over a foreign
national on the basis of personal service within a state. This practice, known as
"tag" jurisdiction, was approved by the Supreme Court in Burnham v. Superior
Court, 495 U.S. 604, 608-09 (1990). 'Tag" jurisdiction is generally
characterized by the rest of the world as "exorbitant." See Eric B. Fastiff, Note,
The Proposed Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and
Commercial Judgments: A Solution to Butch Reynold's Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Problems, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 469, 483-84 (1995). While the
existence of "tag" jurisdiction is debatable, It is unlikely to be overturned as a
domestic constitutional precedent in the near future. See, e.g., Burnham, 495
U.S. at 628-40 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing for the use of an
"independent inquiry" into a state's assertion of personal jurisdiction rather
than basing the analysis solely on historical perspective). See generally Robert
C. Casad, Jurisdiction in Civil Actions at the End of the Twentieth Century: Forum
Conveniens and Forum Non Conveniens, 7 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 91 (1999)
(arguing for a return to the four-step analysis by International Shoe and its
progeny in order to correct the Court's recent decisions that may serve to
confuse jurisdiction analysis); Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate:
End of the Century or Beginning of the Millennium?, 7 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
111 (1999) (providing a comparison to Professor Casad's analysis of jurisdiction
under International Shoe). The issue of asserting jurisdiction over foreign
nationals Is also the subject of the current Hague Conference on Jurisdiction
and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. See Preliminary Draft
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, available at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html (last
visited Apr. 21, 2001).
11. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 640 (1985) (enforcing the agreement to arbitrate between the parties
under the Federal Arbitration Act); Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1,
15 (1972) (holding the forum selection clause agreed to by the parties should
control "absent a strong showing that it should be set aside"); Afram Carriers,
Inc. v. Moeykens, 145 F.3d 298, 301 (5th Cir. 1998); RIchards v. Lloyd's of
London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting appellant's claim that
the arbitration clause agreeing to arbitrate in London violates public policy
because appellant's claims arise under United States Securities and RICO
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of foreign sovereigns are at stake,12 dismissals in favor of foreign
forums under the forum non conveniens doctrine,1 3 decisions
about whether domestic, foreign or international norms or
privileges should prevail, 14 enforcement of arbitration clauses,
5
service on foreign defendants, ' r transnational discovery, 17 the
statutes); Roby v. Corps. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1360 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding
that a forum selection clause is not invalid simply because the claim raised is
not recognized under the laws of the forum selected); Riley v. Kingsley
Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 956 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that
the parties must abide by the forum selection clause agreed to by the parties);
cf. Omron Healthcare, Inc. v. Maclaren Exports, Ltd., 28 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir.
1994) (enforcing foreign judgment by the High Court of Justice in England and
rejecting the claim that procedures provided for in an arbitration agreement
violated American public policy). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The United
States' Approach to International Civil Litigation: Recent Developments in Forum
Selection, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 1 (1998) (discussing forum selection as it
relates to service of process under the Hague Service Convention, personal
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), and lis alibi pendens).
12. See, e.g., Torres v. S. Peru Copper Co., 113 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir.
1997) (granting federal question jurisdiction because plaintiffs complaint
"raise[d] substantial questions of federal common law by implicating important
foreign policy concerns"); Pravin Bankers Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular del
Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 854, 856 (2d Cir. 1997) (analyzing Peru's debt negotiations
in light of American public policy in determining whether to grant judicial
comity).
13. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 247 (1981)
(determining that the issue of substantive law "should ordinarily not be given
conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry);
Capital Currency Exch. v. Nat'l Westminster Bank PLC, 155 F.3d 603, 612 (2d
Cir. 1998) (holding under forum non conveniens doctrine suits raised under the
Sherman Antitrust Act are subject to dismissal); PT United Can Co. v. Crown
Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 73-75 (2d Cir. 1998) (outlining the two step
inquiry into forum non conveniens analysis); In re Union Carbide Gas Plant
Disaster, 809 F.2d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1987) (allowing transfer of a case to India
under forum non conveniens grounds); In re Phillips Serv. Corp., 49 F. Supp. 2d
629, 633-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (outlining theforum non conveniens analysis).
14. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694,
706-08 (1988) (holding that the Hague Service Convention did not apply to
service where Illinois law allowed service on a subsidiary corporation in lieu of
service on a foreign parent corporation); Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom S.A.,
157 F.3d 922 (2d Cir. 1998).
15. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 616 (discussing whether claims
arising under the Sherman Antitrust Act may be arbitrated in a foreign
country); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974) (upholding
arbitration agreements).
16. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk, 486 U.S. at 696 (determining whether
service on a subsidiary company in lieu of service on foreign parent corporation
complies with the Hague Service Convention); United States v. Danenza, 528
F.2d 390, 392 (2d Cir. 1975) (enforcing subpoena of foreign dependent following
Italian Service requirements); Chung v. Tarom, S.A., 990 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ill.
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procedures for proving foreign law,' 8 staying proceedings in the
United States pending the resolution of foreign or international
proceedings, 9 enjoining the prosecution of foreign or domestic
20 2 'legal proceedings, the enforceability of foreign judgments, and
1998) (granting defendant's motion to quash service because service on
corporate subsidiary was insufficient to reach foreign corporation); Teknekron
Mgmt., Inc. v. Quante Fernmeldetechnik, 115 F.R.D. 175, 177 (D. Nev. 1987)
(granting sua sponte a motion to quash service based on failure to comply with
West German service of process rules).
17. Soclit Nationale Industrielle Airospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct. for
the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544, 547 (1987). Many of the conflicts in the
field of transnational discovery are caused by foreign "blocking" statutes, which
not only deem certain matters that would be discoverable in American courts
privileged, but actually prohibit the disclosure of certain types of information
that would be discoverable in American courts. Article IA of the often litigated
French blocking statute states:
Subject to treaties or international agreements and applicable laws and
regulations, it is prohibited for any party to request, seek or disclose, in
writing, orally or otherwise, economic, commercial, industrial, financial
or technical documents or information leading to the constitution of
evidence with a view to foreign judicial or administrative proceedings or
in connection therewith.
Id. at 526 n.6 (quoting French Penal Code Law No. 80-538); see also Violation of
the Duty of Confidentiality, v.9.6.1965 (BGB1.1 5.404) (ordering corporate
executives and employees prohibited from revealing business secrets). See
generally Kurt Riechenberg, The Recognition of Foreign Privileges in United
States Discovery Proceedings, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 80 (1988).
18. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (requiring a party relying on foreign law to
give notice), with N.Y. C.P.L.R 451 1(b) (McKinney 1992) (allowing court to take
judicial notice without request of the laws of foreign countries).
19. See, e.g., Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111,
111 (1999) (refusing to exercise original jurisdiction and enforce the
International Court of Justice's order requiring the United States to stop the
execution by the State of Arizona of a German citizen); Breard v. Greene, 523
U.S. 371, 378-79 (1998) (denying petitioners writ of habeas corpus and stay
application regardless of proceeding in International Court of Justice); Ingersoll
Milling Mach. Co., v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 684-86 (7th Cir. 1987) (upholding
the district court's decision to stay proceedings in federal court while awaiting
for final determination by the Belgian Court of Appeals).
20. The most frequently cited example involves litigation by Laker Airways
on both sides of the Atlantic. See generally British Airways Bd. v. Laker
Airways, Ltd., 1 A.C. 58 (1984). The case implicated both judicial and
legislative comity, and in July 1983, the court of appeal in London issued an
injunction restraining Laker from prosecuting his American action. Id. at 58.
The House of Lords subsequently reversed, [19841 3 W.L.R. 413. Before the
reversal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia enjoined the other
parties to the suit in the United States from joining a suit by British Airways in
London. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,
955-56 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that the conflict in jurisdiction is caused by a
desire to implement "legislation controlling anticompetitive and restrictive
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the preclusive effect of foreign judgments.22
Despite the myriad circumstances in which comity issues
arise, courts have not articulated workable guidelines for the
application of comity. One obstacle to a workable guideline
stems from the courts' consistent characterization of comity as
discretionary, as a concept "of practice, convenience and
expediency., 23 Indeed, comity has proved so malleable that the
word "doctrine," which connotes a concept that is fixed,
• • 24
grounded, and established, seems inapposite. The current
application suggests that it is more appropriately termed a
"value," since it is at present more in the nature of something
courts either take into account and consider important, or not.
25
Given that this value is sometimes understood and sometimes
misunderstood, the definition of comity is prefaced with a brief
summary of comity's historical antecedents, the views of
scholars who both criticize and support comity, and a pragmatic
proposal as to why comity informs decisions in some cases and
not in others.
A. Pedigree and Practice: Does Comity Exist?
The discretionary approach to comity has a long pedigree, as a
number of able historians have established. During the Middle
Ages, glossators at Bologna, commenting on the role of foreign
law in domestic decisions, observed that "foreign law, in
business practices"); see also Eric Roberson, Comment, Comity Be Damned: The
Use of Antisuit Injunctions Against the Courts of a Foreign Nation, 147 U. PA. L.
REv. 409, 422 (1998) (collecting authorities on anti-suit injunctions in foreign
courts and exploring a split in the circuits).
21. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (providing a
definition of comity): Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d
435, 444 (3d Cir. 1971) (upholding an English court's judgment of default); see
also Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. 265 (1986 &
Supp. 2000). See generally Willis L.M. Reese, The Status in This Country of
Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 783 (1950).
22. Phillips USA, Inc. v. Allflex USA, Inc., 77 F.3d 354, 360 (10th Cir. 1996).
23. Somportex, 453 F.2d at 440.
24. The definitions of "doctrine" include "precept," "dogma," "tenet," or
"principle." THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 915-16 (1993).
25. "Values" include "the principles.., of a person or social group; the
generally accepted or personally held judgment of what is valuable and
important in life." 2 THE SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3542 (1993).
26. See generally Paul, supra note 4; Hessel E. Yntema, The Comity
Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REv. 9 (1966).
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appropriate instances, should be applied to foreign cases.""
Thus, comity's earlier applications involved legislative comity.
The Dutch jurist Ulrich Huber set out three guiding principles to
govern the operation of foreign law within the territory on a
state: "First, all states have sovereign power within their territory
but not beyond. Second, the state has sovereign power over any
person within its territory. And third, when the court applies
foreign law, the court acts on the basis of comity."28  Thus,
international judicial comity was born as much into the world of
politics as into the realm of law. It was applied, in Huber's
words, as "the high authorities of each country offer each other a
hand .29
In the United States, although Joseph Story in 1834 once
described the doctrine as a duty to give effect to the laws of
other nations, most of Story's confrontations with comity came
in the context of federal/state comity in a nation in schism over
slavery. Professor Joel Paul argued strenuously that under
Story's nationalistic view, transnational comity was
discretionary, and that the role of courts "[als the instrument of
the sovereign ... was to interpret and apply the sovereign's will,
not to decide when to recognize foreign interests.,
3
'
In the modern era, courts continue to conclude that judicial
comity is not mandated.32 As the frequently cited opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. observed:
Although more than mere courtesy and accommodation,
comity does not achieve the force of an imperative or
obligation. Rather, it is a nation's expression of
understanding which demonstrates due regard both to
international duty and convenience and to the rights of
persons protected by its own laws. Comity should be
27. Yntema, supra note 26, at 9 (emphasis added). Yntema also notes that
modem comity doctrine owes much of its development to 17th century Dutch
scholars, and credits the nature of the Netherlands as a seafaring and trading
nation "with a more liberal attitude towards foreigners." Id at 19.
28. Paul, supra note 4, at 15.
29. Id. at 17 (quoting ULRICH HUBER, HEEDENSDAEGSE RECHTSGELEERTHEYT
13 (1699)).
30. STORY, supra note 1, at 37.
31. Paul, supra note 4, at 23.
32. Somportex Ltd. V. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 441 (3d
Cir. 1971).
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withheld only when its acceptance would be contrary or
prejudicial to the interest of the nation called upon to
give it effect.
33
Indeed, modem judicial references to comity and convenience
are so frequently written that one wonders whether the
convenience relates not to the circumstances by which courts
apply comity, but rather to the relief of the jurist at not having to
explain the court's reasoning any further.
The imprecision and occasional obfuscation of comity has
generated considerable scholarly debate. Professor Michael
Ramsey would banish comity as a consideration to be taken into
account by courts. 4 His concern is that courts often refer to
comity vaguely rather than engaging in precise legal reasoning to
resolve the issue before them.35 His adjectives represent the
depth of his frustration: "uncertain," "vague," "not appropriate,"
"inaccurate," and "confused."36 In support of his thesis, Ramsey
offers two cases: one involving the recognition of a foreign
judgment, and the other concerning proof of foreign law as
examples of the failure of judicial comity. With respect to the
recognition of foreign judgments, Ramsey notes that courts
enforcing foreign judgments often invoke comity as the basis of
their decisions.37 Ramsey argues, however, that decisions
regarding enforcement of' foreign judgments are not in fact
comity-driven because courts subject the foreign judgment to a
greater degree of scrutiny than American judgments. 38  As
33. Id. at 440 (emphasis added).
34. Ramsey, supra note 4, at 893.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 902-05.
37. Id. at 897-901 (referencing Somportex and Phillips USA, Inc. v. Allflex
USA, Inc.).
38. Id. at 899. In reaching this conclusion, Ramsey examines Phillips USA,
Inc. v. Allflex USA, Inc., 77 F.3d 354 (10th Cir. 1996). Id. at 900. In Allflex, the
court, invoking comity, gave preclusive effect to an Australian judgment on a
breach of contract claim for the defendant on the theory of comity, and refused
to allow a second suit in the United States on a fraud theory. Allflex, 77 F.3d at
361. Ramsey argues that this result was not dictated so much by comity (for
how would the Australian government have been offended?), as it was by the
policies underlying the doctrine of resjudicata. Ramsey, supra note 4, at 900.
The value of comity informed the resjudicata determination that was made.
Professor Ramsey correctly believes that the analysis is often less than clear
where comity is invoked, but note below that such decisions often do involve
some extension of comity, because foreign judgments are often enforced despite
the fact that the proceedings departed substantially from American judicial
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discussed below, this observation on the uselessness of comityis overly .S . 39iovrypessimistic.
With respect to proof of foreign law, Professor Ramsey notes
that in most cases the invocation of comity is illusory because
the question is not one of comity, but rather how we prove
foreign law.40 Thus, he contends that in most circumstances,
the invocation of "notions of comity" serve to obscure rather
than eliminate the issue. 41  Although Professor Ramsey is
accurate in his belief that proof of foreign law is largely an
evidentiary question, the current evidentiary rules have
developed by incorporating comity as a value. Comity has not
been a factor in proof of foreign law for nearly ninety years, given
that American courts in 1912 abandoned the outmoded and
Americentric rule that foreign law is presumed to be identical to
that of the forum.42
procedural norms. See, e.g., Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 842 (2d Cir.
1986) (enforcing German judgment for legal fees out of comity where fee
agreement would have been improper under New York law). See generally
discussion infra Part I.B.
39. See infra notes 51-68 and accompanying texts.
40. Ramsey, supra note 4, at 905-06.
41. Id.
42. Cuba R.R. Co. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912). While issues have arisen
as to how foreign law will be established and whether it is a factual or a legal
issue, no modem decision has suggested that foreign law should not be applied
in appropriate cases. This is primarily because the legislature has taken the
issue from the courts in the form of Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in federal court and various statutes in the state systems. The Rule
provides:
A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign
country shall give notice by pleadings or other reasonable written
notice. The court, in determining foreign law, may consider any
relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not
submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The court's determination shall be treated as a ruling on a
question of law.
FED. R. CIv. P. 44.1. In addition, twenty-eight jurisdictions have adopted the
Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, even though the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws withdrew their recommendations of the Act In 1966.
UNIFORM JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAW ACT, 9A U.L.A. 550 (1965). The Act is
similar to Federal Rule 44.1, except that It expressly mandates that foreign law
determinations are to be made by the court rather than the jury. Still, other
states have adopted statutes providing for judicial notice of foreign law if
supporting documents are provided to the court and the opposing party. If
these conditions are not met, then judicial notice is discretionary. See, e.g.,
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3016, 4511 (McKlnney 1992); see also RUDOLPH B. SCHLESINGER,
ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 32-124 (1998) (providing an
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Professor Joel Paul likewise would abandon comity. In part,
he is frustrated with the doctrine for the same reasons as
Ramsey, and in part because he believes comity to be an
unworkable standard, and one that is neither mandated by
international law or justified on the basis of reciprocity, utility,
courtesy, or morality.43  By contrast, Professor Anne-Marie
Slaughter supports judicial comity. While noting its "general
and amorphous" nature, she writes that comity encompasses
both respect for foreign courts and an awareness that they are
entitled to their fair share of disputes.44 Slaughter suggests that
this need not encompass deference, but that it should include
an awareness of the interests of foreign tribunals. 5 She also
acknowledges that the process can be messy. When judicial
comity and judicial globalization involve interactions among the
courts of different nations, we are confronted by "examples of
judges looking, talking, and sometimes acting beyond the
confines of national legal systems ....46
overview of the approaches followed in various jurisdictions). See generally
Jacob Dolinger, Application, Proof, and Interpretation of Foreign Law: A
Comparative Study in Private International Law, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 225
(1995) (providing a comparative perspective).
43. See generally Paul, supra note 4 (detailing the history and application of
comity, and concluding comity is an unworkable doctrine). With respect to
whether comity is a rule of law, Paul disagrees with the statement in Hilton v.
Guyot, that comity is a part of the law of nations. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113, 118-21 (1895). The application of comity is always portrayed as
discretionary, particularly because there are no rules of customary
international law at present that would require its application. Paul, supra note
4, at 47-48; see supra notes 26-42 and accompanying text. Paul also correctly
notes that there is no empirical evidence showing that the extension of comity
leads foreign nations to extend reciprocal comity. Paul, supra note 4, at 49.
While it is true that no study has demonstrated this fact, such a study would be
worthwhile. As a political matter, the enforcement of the judgment of a foreign
nation quite likely would result in more receptivity to American judgments in
the foreign state. This is currently one of the issues being considered in the
Hague with respect to the draft convention covering personal jurisdiction and
enforcement of foreign judgments. See Linda J. Silberman & Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, A Different Challenge for the ALI: Herein of Foreign County
Judgments, International Treaty, and an American Statute, 75 IND. L.J. 635, 639
(2000). With respect to utility, Paul argues this justification for comity
improperly involves the courts in deciding the executive branch question of
what is in the national interest. Paul, supra note 4, at 50.
44. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Agora: Breard-Court to Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
708, 709 (1998).
45. Id.
46. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103,
1104 (2000).
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The thesis presented here is that, with respect to judicial
comity, Slaughter is correct and Ramsey and Paul are incorrect;
although perhaps differences with the latter two able writers are
complicated by the fact that their arguments are directed
primarily to deficiencies in legislative and executive comity. I
believe, however, that to the extent Professor Paul addresses
judicial comity, he is in error of rejecting comity's utility,
courtesy, and morality.
First, judicial comity can, as a utilitarian matter, foster an
enhanced belief in the fairness of the United States' legal system
and the extent to which foreign litigants trust it. Absent a belief
of fairness and respectfulness in American courts, foreign
litigants will continue to avoid them at all costs, a fact which
complicates life for American businesses and citizens. Second,
courtesy between courts will enhance transnational judicial
cooperation, which becomes increasingly necessary with the
transnational character of many disputes. An absence of
courtesy and comity between courts may permit the aggressive
litigant to engage in duplicative and even vexatious lawsuits in
multiple forums. A defined model of cooperative comity would
foster uniformity, dialogue, cooperation, and consistency in
deciding which cases should proceed, and which cases should
be stayed or dismissed on the basis of international abstention .4
A defined model would also allow courts to allocate
responsibility in areas such as transnational insolvency.
47. Many foreign litigants fear American courts. The reasons range from
fear of American discovery, the protracted nature of litigation in the United
States, and the perceived capriciousness of American juries. Kevin M. Clermont
& Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1120,
1121-22 (1996) (exploring reasons why foreigners fear American courts, and
ultimately determining empirically that foreign litigants in fact do not fare badly
in the United States).
48. In recent years, many courts, in justifying dismissals of domestic
actions where foreign proceedings were already pending, invoked the comity-
based doctrine known as international abstention. See, e.g., Posner v. Essex
Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1222-24 (11th Cir. 1999) (staying proceeding in the
United States because proceedings had already begun in Bermuda); Turner
Entm't Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1523 (1lth Cir. 1994) (staying
United States proceedings because the German court previously rendered
judgment in the case); Goldhammer v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d
248 (D. Mass. 1999); Dragon Capital Partners L.P. v. Merrill Lynch Capital
Servs., Inc., 949 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Caspian Invs., Ltd. v. Vicom
Holdings, Ltd., 770 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
49. Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-
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Finally, considerations of morality counsel that it is wrong and
suggestive of a call to American hegemony for American courts
to conduct litigation with transnational implications without
fully considering and giving weight to the role of foreign courts.
Thus, it is now appropriate for courts and scholars alike to
expand comity's function from one of discretion and confusion to
one of definition, deliberation, and deference.
1. Defining Comity and Examining How and Why Courts Apply It
Turning first to definition, cooperative comity as used here
means that when issues arise in American courts which impact
on or intersect with issues before foreign courts: (1) American
courts should first identify the role and interests of the foreign
tribunal; (2) analyze the requirements of the foreign procedures,
values, orders, and judgments; (3) analyze the American court's
interest in the proceedings; and (4) determine whether the
foreign interests or domestic interests are greater. Where the
foreign interests are stronger, the court should give deference to
the foreign tribunal and its interests. This definition seems
straightforward. Why, then is comity so problematic?
In determining the causes of the comity conundrum, I turn to
the cynic that often perches on the shoulder of commentators on
international law.50 The cynic whispers that the true root of the
comity problem is a fear and distrust of what is foreign, and that
courts are least inclined to extend cooperative comity when it
will require them to become enmeshed in unfamiliar questions of
foreign law or procedure. Judges are accustomed to speaking
with authority and, being human, do not instinctively seek
Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 696, 706-08 (1999) (presenting five
claimed advantages to a universalist approach to international debtor
insolvency); Ulrik Rammeskow Bang-Pedersen, Asset Distribution in
Transnational Insolvencies: Combining Predictability and Protection of Local
Interests, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 385, 386 (1999) (concluding a universalist
approach to bankruptcy adjudication can provide the predictability and
protection required to promote the goals of local interests). See generally Todd
Kraft & Allison Aranson, Transnational Bankruptcies: Section 304 and Beyond,
1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 329; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Creating International
Insolvency Law, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563 (1996); Jeremy Smith, Note,
Approaching Universality: The Role of Comity in International Bankruptcy
Proceedings Litigated in America, 17 B.U. INT'L L.J. 367 (1999).
50. Cf. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 49 (2d ed. 1979) (using the
"cynic's formula" to note "since there is no body to enforce the law, nations will
comply with international law only if it is their interest to do so. ... ").
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solutions that necessitate analysis of unfamiliar rules developed
in a legal system where research is an unfamiliar process. The
cynic suggests that because an increase in employing comity
requires greater study and analysis of foreign law, comity is
often grudgingly and sparingly applied.
In stating the cynic's case, it is not suggested that American
courts are unable or unwilling to engage in an analysis of foreign
law. Many judges analyze foreign law often and all judges
inevitably must grapple with foreign law when it provides the
rule of law in a case. 5' A reluctance to engage foreign law is also
understandable in light of the fact that the research materials
have historically been difficult to locate. 2 Nevertheless, many of
the worst examples of a failure to accord comity result when
comity requires analysis of and immersion in foreign law.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 218-19 (1942) (applying
Soviet law): First Nat'l City Bank v. Compania de Aguaceros, S.A., 398 F.2d
779, 781 (5th Cir. 1968) (applying Panamanian law); Euromepa S.A. v. R.
Esmerian, Inc., 155 F.R.D. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd, 51 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir.
1995) (interpreting French law); Pantone, Inc. v. Hertz Autovermietung, GmbH,
575 F. Supp. 789, 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (applying German law); see also In re Oil
Spill of the "Amoco Cadiz" Off the Coast of France on Mar. 16, 1978, MDL No.
376, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16832, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 1988).
52. Cf. [AN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 54-55 (5th
ed. 1998) (stating the difficulties in researching state practice in determining
international law can occur when it arises in municipal court and it is difficult
to obtain convenient evidence regarding the state of the law).
53. Socltt Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale, 482 U.S. 522, 552 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[Clourts are generally ill equipped to assume the
role of balancing the interests of foreign nations with that of our own. Although
transnational litigation is increasing, relatively few judges are experienced in
the area and the procedures of foreign legal systems are often poorly
understood."). Perhaps this is why in the field of conflicts of law so much
emphasis is given to applying the law of the forum. Section 6 of the
Restatement (Second) on Conflicts of Law requires the application of the law of
the state that is most significantly related to the issue in question.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAws § 6 (1971). To determine which law is
most significantly related, the Restatement lists seven factors:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(1) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Id. Three of these factors will almost certainly weigh in favor of the application
of forum law: the relevant policies of the forum; certainty, predictability and
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Conversely, American courts seem most willing to apply comity
when to do so will eliminate a need to analyze foreign law.
a. Applying Comity To Obviate Examination of Foreign Law
The cynic invites examination of a few representative cases to
support its view. 4 The first cases involve enforcement of foreign
forum selection clauses and foreign judgments. In these cases,
the courts accord a substantial measure of comity, generally
enforcing forum selection clauses consistently and giving a
substantial measure of comity to foreign judgments.
In Omron Healthcare, Inc. v. Maclaren Exports, Ltd. 5 5 the
appellant raised a number of objections to enforcement of a
forum selection clause calling for all disputes between the
parties to be referred to the High Court of Justice in England. 6
Judge Easterbrook rapidly and correctly disposed of the
contention that enforcement of the forum selection clause would
violate the public policy of the United States. He stated, "[wihat
policy in particular? The dominant policy in contract cases is
enforcing the parties' agreement, the better to promote
commerce. American firms can hardly expect to do international
business if American courts permit them to welch on their
commitments to their trading partners."57 The decision was
unremarkable, given the straightforward nature of the forum
selection clause in question.58
Another recent case, also out of the Seventh Circuit, is
noteworthy because of its spirited invocation of comity. In
Society of Lloyd's v. Ashenden'5 9 Judge Posner, writing for the
court, granted enforcement of English judgments in Illinois.60
Illinois, like twenty-nine other states, adopted the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, so the extent of
comity to be accorded had, to some extent, been legislated.6'
uniformity of result; and ease in the determination and application of the law to
be applied.
54. The cases also illustrate that Professor Ramsey is incorrect and argue
that courts do accord a fair degree of comity to foreign judgments.
55. 28 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 1994).
56. Id. at 600.
57. Id. at 603.
58. Id. at 601-02.
59. 233 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2000).
60. Id. at 476.
61. UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AcT, 13 U.L.A. 89
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The Uniform Act provides that final and appealable foreign
judgments are generally enforceable to the same extent as the
62judgments of sister states. It provides grounds for non-
recognition in a variety of circumstances relating to defects in
jurisdiction, insufficient notice, fraud, or other aspects that
would likewise prevent enforcement or permit vacation of a
domestic judgment.63 The only criterion in the Act that is unique
to foreign judgments is the provision that a foreign judgment will
not be deemed conclusive if it was "rendered under a system
which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures
compatible with the requirements of due process of law."
64
Given that the judgment in Society of Lloyd's had been entered
by the Queen's Bench and affirmed by the English Court of
Appeal and House of Lords, and given the importance in
England of impartiality and "scrupulous regard for procedural
rights," Judge Posner dispatched the defendants' contentions
that the British legal system had not accorded them due
process, noting that the suggestion "bordered on the risible."5
What is more interesting is Judge Posner's reasoning
concerning the meaning of due process in the applicable statute.
In determining whether the English court acted consistently
with due process, Judge Posner explained that:
It is a fair guess that no foreign nation has decided to
incorporate our due process doctrines into its own
procedural law; and so we interpret 'due process' in the
Illinois statute ... to refer to a concept of fair procedure
(Supp. 2000). The Act is codified in Illinois at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-618-
5/12-626 (West 1998). Other states that have adopted the Act include Alaska,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia and Washington. In addition, it has been
adopted in the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands. 13 U.L.A. 89 (Supp.
2000).
62. UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3, 13 U.L.A.
265.
63. UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4, 13 U.L.A.
268. Judgments in the federal courts may be vacated on the basis of "mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence which
could by due diligence not have been discovered [previously], .... fraud," or
other reasons. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
64. UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4, 13 U.L.A.
268.
65. Society of Lloyd's, 233 F.3d at 476.
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simple and basic enough to describe the judicial
66processes of civilized nations, our peers.
He then proceeded to analyze not whether the foreign
judgment comported with American notions of due process, but
rather whether it met a second international notion of due
process. The regard given to the foreign court system was
substantial, and the court made it clear that a similar level of
comity would be extended to the legal system of any civilized
nation.67
b. Applying Comity Where an Examination of Foreign Law Is
Necessary
In another decision, Ackermann v. Levine 68 the court accorded
comity to the judgment of a foreign court in a context that is
more problematic for the cynic, because the court applied
foreign law. 9 In Ackermann, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit enforced a German default judgment for
legal fees.7 0  The fees had been calculated in conformity with
Germany's attorney's fee statute, but under American
standards, the fee would have been deemed exorbitant.1  It also
appeared that the American defendant had never been informed
of the fee requirements, as would have been required under
American law.72  Nevertheless, in a decision motivated in
66. Id. at 476-77.
67. Id. at 477. Of course, determining what constitutes a civilized nation
raises a host of other issues, many of them political. For example, Judge
Posner noted that evidence would have been required had the judgment been
rendered in Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, the Congo, or some other nation
where there was a serious question about commitment to due process and the
rule of law. Id.
68. 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986).
69. Id. at 843.
70. Id. at 845.
71. Id. at 837. The German statute, known as the
Bundesrechtstanwaltsgebuehrenordnung, or BRAGO, establishes a fee unit for
each action taken in conjunction with legal representation. Id. The fee is based
in part upon the value of the transaction and the amount of the allowable
BRAGO fee that the lawyer elects to charge. Id. Since the American defendant
had sought legal advice in conjunction with a large transaction, the fees were
much higher than they would have been on a per hour basis in the United
States. Id. See generally Rudolph B. Schlesinger, The German Alternative: A
Legal Aid System of Equal Access to the Private Attorney, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
213 (1977) (assessing the policies behind the fee system in Germany).
72. Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 842. Interestingly, perhaps the Ackermann
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substantial part the basis of comity, the court affirmed the
judgment in all respects but one.73 The court noted that the
increasing international nature of commerce required that
"American courts recognize and respect the judgments entered
by foreign courts to the greatest extent consistent with our own
ideals of justice and fair play., 74  Other courts have followed
similar approaches. 5
Another exception to the practice of applying comity to foreign
judgments occurs in defamation cases, where courts frequently
refuse enforcement of foreign judgments because the defamation
claim would offend the First Amendment protections afforded by
76New York Times v. Sullivan. In Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, the
court's extension of comity engendered reciprocity. American contingent fee
arrangements are deemed to violate the public policy of Germany, yet in 1992,
the German Supreme Court enforced an American judgment for a contingent
fee. Decision of the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) from June 4, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 1327, 1334 (1993); see also Michael J. Maloney & Allison Taylor
Blizzard, Ethical Issues in the Context of International Litigation: "Where Angels
Fear to Tread," 36 S. Tx. L. REV. 933, 945-49 (1995) (examining the question
of competing ethical standards with respect to attorneys' fees in transnational
litigation).
73. Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 845.
74. Id. at 845 (quoting Tahan V. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 868 (D.C. Cir.
1981)).
75. See, e.g., Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805,811 (9th Cir. 1997)
(subjecting Native American tribal judgment to due process analysis); Guinness
PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 900 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding an injunction issued by
the High Court of England comparable to a temporary restraining order issued
by a United States court and therefore does not violate due process). Courts
also are somewhat less inclined to grant comity when the action of the foreign
court is a provisional remedy rather than a final judgment. In Pilkington Bros.
P.L.C. v. AFG Indus., Inc., 581 F. Supp. 1039 (D. Del. 1984), the court declined
to enforce a preliminary injunction issued by a court in England because the
measure was temporary, not based on a full hearing of the evidence, and
because:
Were this Court to issue Pilkington's requested relief, it would interfere
unnecessarily in those foreign proceedings .... For example, upon a
future application to this Court for a sanction against violations of its
order, this Court would be compelled to interpret and apply an
injunction which was drafted by the English High Court ....
Id. at 1045. A domestic courts interpretation of a foreign injunction may lead to
inconsistent interpretation and enforcement of foreign injunctions. Id. This
case nevertheless seems to support the cynic because the American judge
feared becoming intertwined in English law and procedure. See generally
George A. Bermann, Provisional Relief in Transnational Litigation, 35 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 553 (1997) (addressing same of the major problems related to
enforcement of transnational litigation).
76. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed a district
court decision denying enforcement of a British libel judgment.77
The question of whether the judgment would be incompatible
with the public policy of Maryland had been certified to a
Maryland court, which had examined British law and concluded
that British law contravened the constitutional and policy
requirements of the state by not requiring proof of fault and by
virtue of a presumption that all defamatory statements are
false. 8 It is arguable, however, that in Telnikoff the decision was
driven not by a failure to apply comity but rather by the strength
of the legal rules governing the First Amendment implications of
defamation claims.
The cynic reminds us that the results in two of the above
cases were in situations where it was easy to incorporate comity
into the analysis. The application of comity in Ackermann was
less easy in light of the need to analyze German law, but once
the job was done, the opinion dealt with the issue with such
finality that a legal rule was established and future Second
Circuit decisions relating to German courts' attorney's fee
awards need not repeat the exercise. The result in Telnikoff,
where the foreign judgment was not enforced is at first glance
most problematic for the cynic's "fear of the forum" thesis, since
the resolution did involve an examination of foreign law. British
law, however, is relatively easily researched due to the
availability of British materials in many libraries and on-line
databases, and due to the absence of language difficulties. The
defamation cases also involve clear policy issues because of the
importance of the First Amendment as a core constitutional
value. 79 Finally, the cynic points out that the court making the
ultimate determination in Telnikoff did not itself have to grapple
with foreign law, but was rather able to certify the question to
the state courts.
Next, the cynic asks about a particular group of cases where
some courts have avoided evaluation of foreign tribunals and
foreign law.80 These cases concern the extension of cooperative
77. No. 95-7138, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10628, at *2 (D.C. Cir. May 5,
1998) (per curiam).
78. Telnikoffv. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997).
79. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964); Jefferson
County Sch. Dist. v. Moody's Investors Servs., 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999).
80. See, e.g., Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1099 (2d
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comity to the process of assisting interested foreign litigants in
obtaining discovery in the United States. The extent to which
such assistance is given implicates courts willingness to both
consider the interests of foreign courts and engage foreign law
and has divided the courts of appeals.
II. APPLYING COOPERATIVE COMITY
One of the thorniest questions that arises in the context of
court-to-court comity relates to the circumstances under which
foreign litigants may obtain discovery from an American court
for use in foreign proceedings. The specific question that has
split the federal courts of appeals is whether an American court
should give civil discovery assistance when the documents or
testimony would not as a matter of law be discoverable in the
foreign action. 8'
The applicable statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1782 is silent on the
question and provides:
Cir. 1995) ("We do not believe that an extensive examination of foreign law
regarding the existence of and extent of discovery in the forum country is
desirable in order to ascertain the attitudes of foreign nations outside discovery
assistance."). Another example of this "fear of the foreign" comes up not in the
context of comity, but in the persistent reluctance of American courts to look to
the laws of other nations for guidance in difficult cases, a reluctance that is not
shared by the courts of other nations. Perhaps the most troubling example is
the Supreme Court's refusal to look to the laws of other lands in conjunction
with the question of whether imposing the death penalty in the case of murders
committed while the accused was a minor constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 n. 1 (1989) (refusing to
look to the sentencing practices of other countries when determining the
requisite age for the imposition of the death penalty); see also Knight v. Florida,
528 U.S. 990 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 830-31 (1988) (looking to the laws of foreign countries in determining
juveniles under the age of sixteen should not be executed. This is a breach of
comity because it does not interfere with the operation of other courts. It does,
however, embody both a lack of respect for the thinking of foreign jurists and an
arrogance about the superiority of our own.
81. See, e.g., In re Metallgesellschaft, 121 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1997); Euromepa,
51 F.3d at 1099; In re Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Malev
Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1992); cf. John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry
Corp., 754 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1985) (concluding that there is no requirement
that discovery sought in United States be admissible in foreign proceeding). For
examples of cases holding that district courts asked to give aid to foreign
litigants may inquire Into discoverability of the materials in the foreign
proceedings, see In re Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992); In re Lo Ka
Chun, 858 F.2d 1564 (1lth Cir. 1988); In re Trygg-Hansa Ins. Co., Ltd., 896 F.
Supp. 624 (E.D. La. 1995).
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The district court of the district in which a person
resides or is found may order him to give his testimony
or statement or to produce a document or other thing
for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international
tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted
before formal accusation. The order may be made
pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by
a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application
of any interested person and may direct that the
testimony or statement be given, or the document or other
thing be produced, before a person appointed by the
court. By virtue of his appointment, the person
appointed has power to administer any necessary oath
and take the testimony or statement. The order may
prescribe the practice and procedure, which may be in
whole or in part the practice and procedure of the
foreign country or the international tribunal, for taking
the testimony or statement or producing the document
or other thing. To the extent that the order does not
prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be
taken, and the document or other thing produced, in
accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.82
In the first years after the passage of the act, courts or
investigative bodies in the course of criminal investigations
invoked it most frequently.8 3  With respect to the provision
allowing civil litigants access to American discovery, for the
reasons discussed in the following pages, cooperative comity
should be applied, since the statute involves American courts
directly in a court proceeding pending abroad. Analyzing the
question in cooperative comity terms, the district courts should
render expeditious assistance under § 1782 when the request
for assistance comes from a foreign court and that in all but the
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
83. See Tariq Mundiya, U.S. Court Invites Foreign Litigants To Use U.S.
Discovery Laws, 42 IN'L & COMP. L.Q. 356, 357 (1993). See, e.g., In re Request
for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad & Tobago, 848 F.2d
1151, 1155 (11th Cir. 1988) (upholding district court's decision to grant
discovery motion brought by Ministry Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago for
bank records needed in Criminore investigation); In re Order for Judicial
Assistance In a Foreign Proceeding in the High Court of Justice, Chancery Div.,
England, 147 F.R.D. 223, 226 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (noting the purpose of§ 1782 is
to foster jurisprudential cooperation between the United States and foreign
countries); In re Ct. of Comm'r of Patents for Republic of S. Ar., 88 F.R.D. 75,
77 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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most extraordinary circumstances, they need not inquire into
the discoverability of the information in the foreign proceeding
but rather should accord deference to the foreign courts
interpretation of its own law of discoverability. When the
request comes from a civil litigant, however, the district court in
exercising its discretion should ask that party to make a prima
facie showing that the testimony, document, or other item would
be discoverable in the foreign proceeding, and in the event of a
question, to ask for briefing or, in appropriate cases, to send a
letter rogatory to the court where the proceeding is pending.
8 4
This, however, has not been the construction of civil discovery
requests adopted by some courts, most notably by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Indeed, because
analysis of these cases illustrates why a new model of comity is
needed, the following discussion examines them in some detail.
One of the early decisions to endorse an expansive view of civil
discovery under § 1782 was the Second Circuit's opinion in In re
Malev Hungarian Airlines.85 In that case the question was not
whether American courts would grant discovery beyond the
scope of what was allowed in the foreign proceeding, but rather
the narrower question of whether the discovery had to be sought
first in the foreign court.86  The case involved a breach of
contract action brought by Pratt & Whitney, a manufacturer of
84. The issue has split the commentators as well. Compare Mundiya, supra
note 83, at 362 (arguing that granting discovery without inquiring into foreign
law will not result in reciprocity of cooperation), and Steven M. Saraisky,
Comment, How to Construe Section 1782: A Textual Prescription To Restore the
Judge's Discretion, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127, 1145-50 (1994) (promoting a three-
part test judge's should employ before determining whether the discovery
motion under § 1782 should be granted), with Jennifer S. Bales, Initiating and
Responding to Discovery in Transnational Litigation: Procedures and Challenges,
66 TENN. L. REv. 765, 779 (1999) (noting the Fourth Circuit did not require
inquiry into foreign country's discovery laws), and Hans Smit, Recent
Developments in International Litigation, 35 S. TEX. L.J. 215, 235 (1994)
(arguing that § 1782 neither explicitly nor implicitly requires United States
courts to determine admissibility under foreign law), and Jeffrey A. Wortman,
Note, In Search of Discovery: The Split Between the Circuits Surrounding a
Threshold Discoverability Requirement to Provide Assistance Under 28 U.S.C. §
1782, 30 TEx. INT'L L.J. 583, 597 (1995) (noting that by a court granting a §
1782 discovery motion, it does not necessarily require the discovery be
admissible in the foreign proceeding).
85. 964 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1992). The Second Circuit held that nothing in §
1782 required a litigant to exhaust foreign remedies. See id. at 100.
86. Id. at 100. The district court held that Malev should have first sought
discovery from the Hungarian courts before relying on § 1782. Id.
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aircraft engines, in the municipal court of Budapest against
Malev, the national Hungarian airline.87 Within four days of
answering the complaint and without seeking discovery in
Hungary, Malev invoked the assistance of the American court
under § 1782 and sought discovery from a number of Pratt &
Whitney employees in Connecticut.8 8 The district court refused
discovery based on Malev's failure to make any attempt to obtain
discovery in the court where the action was proceeding.89 The
Second Circuit reversed, relying first on a brief introductory
"Statement" at the beginning of the Senate Report on the
comprehensive bill relating to transnational litigation that
contained, among other things, the provision that ultimately
amended § 1782.90
The Senate report indicated the hope of the drafters that the
measures in the bill would encourage other countries to adjust
their procedures.1 The Second Circuit concluded that foreign
litigants need not seek the discovery first in the foreign
proceeding in light of the statute's "twin aims of providing
efficient means of assistance to participants in international
litigation in our federal courts and encouraging foreign countries
by example to provide similar means of assistance to our
,,92
courts....
This interpretation of the Act, based on a vision of the United
States as a leader in opening up its courts to assist parties in
foreign litigation, was well-intentioned. Unfortunately, the
interpretation failed to give weight to either the express language
of the act vesting a broad discretion in the district court or to the
interests of comity. The first question should have been whether
the involvement of an American court at such a preliminary
stage would facilitate the procedures of the foreign court
properly exercising jurisdiction over the matter. Ironically, what
the Second Circuit took away from the district court in Malev in
terms of discretion to afford comity to the foreign court by
staying out of the proceeding, it gave back in discretion to
determine the method of affording relief. In giving instructions
87. Id. at 98.
88. Id. at 98-99.
89. Id. at 100.
90. Id. at 99.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 100 (emphasis added).
20011 615
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 50:591
as to the proceedings on remand, the Second Circuit held that
the district court could require Malev to prepare a plan for
discovery and submit it to the Budapest court for a
determination of relevance before coming to the district court for
the actual discovery.93 While the ultimate result in Malev was
therefore not problematic, the observation that § 1782 provided
an open door for foreign litigants provided the basis for future
mischief.
In Euromepa,94 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
quoted Malev, and adopted the most rigidly anti-comity
perspective of any court that has considered the § 1782
discovery issue.95 The court held that a district judge abused his
discretion in denying American discovery to a litigant in a
French proceeding pending before the Cour d'Appel de
Versailles.96 The district judge refused the litigant's request for
discovery under § 1782 because the judge's review of French
procedural law yielded the clear conclusion that the discovery
would not be allowed under French law.97
The Second Circuit opinion is notable in that prior opinions
focused on the question of whether the district court was
93. Id. at 102. There was a strong dissent by Judge Feinberg, who not only
disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the statute, but who was
incredulous at the fact the majority held to the interpretation while allowing the
district court to send the litigants ultimately to Budapest. Id. at 105 (Feinberg,
J., dissenting). Judge Feinberg questioned, "[if the district judge can impose
such a sensible requirement [of establishing relevancy] later, why bar it at the
outset?" Id. (Feinberg, J., dissenting). Judge Feinberg continued by stating
that "[district court Judge Clariel denied discovery because there was no
showing of need and he was concerned over the burden of involving a
Connecticut district court in granting routine discovery for foreign litigation."
Id. (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
94. 51 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1995).
95. Id. at 1099-1100. The Second Circuit held that United States courts
should only deny a § 1782 request if there is "authoritative proof' that the
foreign court would reject the evidence obtained under § 1782. Id.
96. Id.atllOO-01.
97. Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 155 F.R.D. 80, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1994),
rev'd, 51 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1995). In reaching this conclusion, the district
court reasoned that the statute by its language vested the court with broad
discretion, citing In re Gianoli, 3 F.3d at 59. The court noted that the language
in Senate Report No. 1580, encouraged the courts to take into account the
attitudes of government from which the request emanates. Id. at 82. The court
then reasoned, based on a careful analysis of both the applicable rules of
French procedure and the fact that Euromepa had not even tried to employ
French procedures, that the discovery should not be granted. Id. at 83-84.
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required to determine the availability of the discovery in the
98foreign tribunal. In Euromepa, by contrast, the district court
engaged in a thoughtful review of French law and was reversed
precisely for engaging in such inquiry.
99
As had the Malev court, the Second Circuit relied upon the
statement in the legislative history. Additionally, the court
noted an article by Professor Hans Smit, an architect of the
comprehensive bill, commenting on the same Statement in the
legislative history. Professor Smit wrote that the drafters of the
statute thought that "making the extension of American
assistance dependent on foreign law would open a veritable
Pandora's box... [and would] turn [a request for cooperation]
into an unduly expensive and time-consuming fight about
foreign law. ' 100
98. See, e.g., In re Gianoli, 3 F.3d at 57 (holding that § 1782 does not
require a finding of discoverability in foreign court); John Deere, Ltd. v. Sperry
Corp., 754 F.2d 132, 134 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that district court improperly
exercised its discretion by relying on foreign court's admissibility rules to deny
discovery).
99. Euromepa, 155 F.R.D. at 83-84. In cases where the discovery is sought
in aid of a private commercial arbitration, the Second and Fifth Circuits have
limited the use of § 1782 in order to avoid a conflict with the policy of limiting
discovery under the Federal Arbitration Act. See, e.g., Nat'l Broad. Co. v. Bear
Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 1999) (quashing a subpoena for third
party discovery under § 1782 in a case where the foreign proceeding was a
private arbitration administered by the International Chamber of Commerce).
The Second Circuit reasoned that the provision in § 1782 providing courts to
order persons in the jurisdiction to produce documents, testimony or
statements for use in "foreign or international tribunals" did not extend to
private arbitrations. Id. at 190-91. To extend the act to arbitration
proceedings, the court reasoned, was neither within the definition of "foreign or
international tribunals" within the meaning of the act, nor was it in accord with
§ 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which confers the authority to seek discovery
from the federal courts upon the arbitrators, not parties. Id. at 187, 189-90;
see also Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th
Cir. 1999) (concluding "the term 'foreign and international tribunals' in § 1782
was not intended to authorize resort to United States federal courts to assist
discovery in private international arbitrations"). Prior to these decisions, there
was extensive scholarly argument positing that the meaning of "foreign and
international tribunals" should be read to include arbitral tribunals. See Hans
Smit, American Assistance to Litigation in Foreign and International Tribunals:
Section 1782 of Title 28 of the U.S.C. Revisited, 25 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 1,
5-8 (1998) (discussing the tribunals and litigants to which assistance may be
granted).
100. Hans Smit, Recent Developments in International Litigation, 35 S. TEX. L.
REV. 215, 235 (1994). The references to these types of difficulties, of course,
has caused the cynic to nod knowingly.
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With regard to prior precedents, the Euromepa court observed
that in Gianoli, "we held that the discoverability of requested
material under foreign law is simply one factor that a district
judge may consider in the exercise his or her [sic] discretion."'0'1
The breadth of this discretion, however, narrowed as the opinion
progressed. The court held that "[wie do not believe that an
extensive examination of foreign law regarding the existence and
extent of discovery in the forum country is desirable in order to
ascertain the attitudes of foreign nations to outside discovery
assistance." 10 2  Ultimately the Second Circuit only approved
consideration of foreign declarations that "specifically address
the use of evidence gathered in foreign procedures,",03 and held
that district courts should generally afford discovery assistance
"absent specific directions to the contrary from a foreign
forum."' 10 4 The opinion in Euromepa is particularly puzzling in
that it was authored by Judge Calibresi, who in other decisions
urged American judges to consider foreign law and who
generally has a reputation as an internationalist.'05
Other Second and Fifth Circuit cases concurred in limiting the
discretion of district courts to include consideration of foreign
law in the analysis of § 1782 and such circuits continue to
subscribe to the view that "[wie have rejected any requirement
that evidence sought in the United States pursuant to § 1782(a)
be discoverable under the laws of the foreign country that is the
locus of the underlying proceeding.",0 6 In one extreme example
of the excesses that Euromepa invites, a Spanish corporation
litigating before a court in Spain, emboldened by the Second
Circuit's Eurormepa invitation to exploit expansive American
discovery, petitioned a judge in the Southern District of New
101. Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1098.
102. Id. at 1099.
103. Id. at 1100.
104. Id. at 1102. In his dissent, Judge Jacobs argued that "[t]his rigid
formulation narrows useful discretion and invites friction with the courts of
other countries ...." Id. at 1104 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
105. United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring) (discussing the value of looking to foreign courts for assistance); see
also Slaughter, supra note 44, at 709.
106. In re Metallgesellschaft AG, 121 F.3d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1997); see also In
re Letter Rogatory from the First Ct. of First Instance in Civil Matters, Caracas,
Venezuela, 42 F.3d 308, 310-11 (5th Cir. 1995) (discussing limitations on
inclusions of consideration of foreign law in § 1782 analysis).
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York to order a Chase Manhattan European affiliate to produce
documents in Spain.10 7 The district court stated that it was
unwilling to find that § 1782 required it to order the production
of documents located in the foreign country where the action
was pending."'
The Third Circuit, in In re Bayer AG,'09 also rejected a
"discoverable-abroad" requirement, holding that applicants
under § 1782 must make a prima facie showing that the
application is made: (1) by either a "foreign or international
tribunal" or by an "interested person"; (2) that it be for use in a
foreign or international proceeding; and (3) that the entity or
person "from whom the discovery is sought [should] be a
resident of or be found in the district in which the application is
filed.""10
The Third Circuit, however, evidenced some concern for comity
where the substance of the discovery was objectionable, as in
cases where discovery would be privileged in the foreign
jurisdiction."' In this regard, the court placed the burden on
the party opposing discovery to demonstrate the circumstances
that would justify a denial of discovery. 1 2 The court continued
by giving the district court discretion to consider any foreign
legal materials applicable to the question. 13 While this view
gives more weight to the policies and procedures of foreign
courts than Euromepa, it is puzzling why the value judgments
another country has made about the role of discovery are
entitled to so little weight, since American discovery is, to say
the least, both unique and not widely admired."4
The First, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits express a contrasting
view. In In re Asta Medica S.A.,1 5 the First Circuit emphasized
the importance of court-to-court cooperative comity and imposed
a burden on the party seeking discovery under § 1782 to show
107. In re Sarrio S.A., For Assistance Before Foreign Tribunal, NO. M9-372,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14822, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1995).
108. Id. at*10.
109. 146 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 1998).
110. Id. at 193.
111. Id. at 195.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See discussion infra notes 158-62.
115. 981 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1992).
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that the information would be discoverable in the foreign
system. '1 6 If this was unduly difficult, the district court could
either ask the foreign court for assistance or retain a foreign law
expert. ' 7 The court reasoned that if Congress' goal had been to
facilitate transnational litigation, it would hardly have intended
a construction that would put U.S. courts on a "collision course
with foreign tribunals and legislatures, which have carefully
chosen the procedures and laws best suited for their concepts of
litigation." ' 8
Similarly, in In re Request for Assistance from Ministry on Legal
Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago,"9 the Eleventh Circuit stated
that while a court granting a request for assistance under §
1782 need not decide whether the information would be
admissible in a foreign court, it did need to determine that the
information "would be discoverable in the foreign country before
granting assistance."'2 ° In reaching this conclusion the court
noted that in adopting the recommendations of a Commission
on International Rules and Judicial Procedure that led to the
enactment of § 1782, the hope was to adjust practices "in order
to improve practices of international cooperation in litigtion."''
116. Id. at 7. The case involved patent infringement claims that were
pending in France, England, Belgium, and the Netherlands and, more
specifically, requests by the European defendants to obtain discovery from non-
party witnesses which would, according to uncontested affidavits from foreign
law experts, have been unavailable in the foreign proceedings. Id. at 2-3.
117. Id.at7n.7.
118. Id. at 6.
119. 848 F.2d 1151 (llthCir. 1988).
120. Id. at 1156 (involving a criminal investigation). In a subsequent
decision, In re Lo Ka Chun, 858 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1988), the court
reaffirmed the Trinidad and Tobago holding and remanded a discovery request
under § 1782 for a specific determination of whether the information would be
discoverable in the foreign proceeding. Id. at 1566.
121. Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1153 (citing Letter from Rep. Oscar
Cox, Chairman of Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure, to
John McCormack, Speaker of the House (May 28, 1963), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3792-94). Indeed, Chairman Cox's letter would seem to have
expressed a hope that the enactment of the measures would encompass notions
of comity:
Enactment of the proposed bill into law will constitute a major step in
bringing the United States to the forefront of nations adjusting their
procedures to those of sister nations and thereby providing equitable
and efficacious procedures for the benefit of tribunals and litigants
involved in litigation with international aspects.
1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3792-94.
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia likewise took
the view that the document sought should be discoverable in the
foreign tribunal in In re Letter of Request from the Crown
Prosecution Service.122 That case held, in an opinion by Judge
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, that a request for discovery by the Crown
Prosecution Service would require the district court to fashion
an order for the taking of evidence appropriate in a British
proceeding and reversed the district court for not inquiring
"more closely [into] whether the projected evidence-taking
procedure 'represents British practice.
' '1
23
The Euromepa and Malev decisions, as well as the decisions
that followed them, were wrong, and the Asta Medica and
Trinidad and Tobago decisions, and the cases that follow them,
were right.124 To demonstrate how cooperative comity would fit
into such an analysis, I advance five arguments as to the proper
construction of § 1782, two of which are informed by cooperative
comity.
1. Section 1782 Expressly Vests Discretion in the District
Courts
First, the unambiguous language of the statute vests
discretion in the district judge. 125  The inclusion of express
permissive language in the act grants district courts a broad
range of discretion, including the discretion to determine
whether their actions would interfere with the policies and
practices of the foreign or international tribunal with jurisdiction
over the case. 26  District judges may order testimony or
documents related to a foreign or international proceeding; they
may order the discovery either pursuant to a letter rogatory or
request of an interested person; and may prescribe the practice
or procedure of the foreign country or international tribunal for
122. 870 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
123. Id. at 692-93 (quoting Order, In re Letter of Request from the Crown
Prosecution Service, Misc. No. 88-0028 (D.D.C. Jul. 14, 1988)).
124. But see Christopher Walker Sanzone, Extra-Statutory Discovery
Requirements: Violating the Twin Purposes of 28 U.S.C. Section 1782, 29 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 117. (1996); Smit, supra note 84, at 234-35. Both authors
argue strenuously that no discoverability requirement should be either read
into the statute or imposed by a district court in the exercise of its discretion.
125. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (Supp. 2000).
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the taking of testimony statements or documents.127 In addition,
district judges may give any applicable privileges effect,
including the privileges of the foreign forum. 28 Thus, the plain
language of the statute seems to permit and suggest a broad
range of discretion in the district courts to determine what
cooperative comity requires. Specifically, the language in the
statute allows the district court to identify the issues pending
before the foreign court, and to require the party seeking the
assistance to demonstrate the permissibility of the discovery
under the laws of the foreign forum. Where the foreign litigant
cannot or will not provide this information, the court itself has
the power to inquire into foreign law.
2. The Legislative History Does Not Support Mandatory
Discovery Under Section 1782
Euromepa and its progeny have not only improperly looked to
the straightforward legislative history, but have also, even
assuming reference to the legislative history is appropriate,
misread that history. With respect to the first point, even
opponents of textualism would agree that the real or imagined
goals of the legislature should not guide the decisions of courts
when the meaning of a statute is clear. 29 As discussed above, §
1782 expressly protects both the discretion of the district court
and suggests in its references to the procedures and privileges of
the foreign tribunal that the statute is meant to foster comity.
Second, the legislative history is not supportive of the position
endorsed in Euromepa. The Malev court interpreted the
comprehensive legislation as the "twin aims of providing efficient
means of assistance to participants in international litigation in
our federal courts and encouraging foreign countries by example
127. Id. (prescribing that the practice or procedure of a foreign or
international tribunal is suggestive of the cooperative comity model).
128. Id.; In re Letter of Request from the Crown Prosecution Service, 870
F.2d 686, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that § 1782 "permits" but does not
"command" following foreign law).
129. The most vocal proponent of textualism is Justice Scalia, who has
repeatedly emphasized that it is what legislatures write rather than what they
mean that is important. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S.
504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Frank H. Easterbrook,
Symposium, On Statutory Interpretation: What Does Legislative History Tell Us?,
66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 441, 442 (1990) (analyzing Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion in Green); see also generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw (1997).
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to provide similar means of assistance to our courts," which
originated from the preface not merely to § 1782 but to the entire
bill.'30 The bill contained a broad range of purposes, including
service of documents in the United States, obtaining evidence
abroad, proving foreign official documents in American
proceedings, subpoenaing witnesses in foreign proceedings, and
transmitting letters rogatory between United States and foreign
courts. 131 The statement noted that the comprehensive
legislation emanated from a Commission on International Rules
of Judicial Procedure appointed by the executive and developed
with the assistance of Columbia Law School.'3 2 The statement in
the Senate Report provided in full that:
Until recently, the United States has not engaged itself
fully in efforts to improve practices of international
cooperation in litigation. The steadily growing
involvement of the United States in international
intercourse and the resulting increase in litigation with
international aspects have demonstrated the necessity
for statutory improvements and other devices to
facilitate the conduct of such litigation. Enactment of
the bill into law will constitute a major step in bringing
the United States to the forefront of nations adjusting
their procedures to those of sister nations and thereby
providing equitable and efficacious procedures for the
benefit of tribunals and litigants involved in litigation
with international aspects.
It is hoped that the initiative taken by the United
States in improving its procedures will invite foreign
countries similarly to adjust their procedures. 33
Thus, the intent of the legislature in enacting the bill as a
whole was to adjust procedures to those of foreign courts-not
to act in disregard of their procedures and policies. Moreover,
the legislative history applicable specifically to § 1782 supports
giving judges the authority to consider the policies of the foreign
tribunal with respect to discovery. The Senate Report regarding
130. In re Malev Hungarian Airlines v. United Techs. Int'l, Inc., 964 F.2d 97,
100 (2d Cir. 1992); S. REP. No. 1580, at 1 (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782-83.
131. S. REP. No. 1580, at 1 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782-83.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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§ 1782 states:
[Ilt leaves the issuance of an appropriate order to the
discretion of the court which, in proper cases, may
refuse to issue an order or may impose conditions it
deems desirable. In exercising its discretionary power,
the court may take into account the nature and attitudes
of the government of the country from which the request
emanates and the character of the proceedings in that
134
country ....
Thus, the legislative history applicable to § 1782 does not
mandate a construction of the Act that would extend our well-
intentioned generosity with discovery so far as to preclude
inquiry into whether the generosity is appreciated by the foreign
forum.
C. Comity Precludes the Imposition of American Discovery Rules
on Foreign Tribunals
A third argument against the Euromepa interpretation of §
1782 is based on the principle that cooperative comity requires
American courts to harmonize their proceedings under the Act
with the procedures of other countries. The injection of
American discovery procedures into foreign proceedings will
otherwise be both counterproductive to efficiency interests in
both forums and may well trigger charges of American
Interference, chauvinism, or legal imperialism. Is American
discovery so inherently valuable that foreign litigants should be
allowed to obtain discovery here if they could not obtain
discovery under the applicable legal procedures where the case
is pending?
No other nation is as wedded to discovery as the United
States. 35  Broad discovery, to be sure, gives the parties
increased access to information and if used effectively may
further the goal that cases are resolved based on the facts rather
than determining on which litigant has superior access to
information.136 Yet even in the United States, there have been
134. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
135. Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First
Century: Toward a New World Order?, 7 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. LAw 153, 154
(1999).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682
(1958) ("modem instruments of discovery.., make a trial less a game of
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concerns over the abuse of discovery, the extent to which it
contributes to the cost of litigation, and the fact that despite the
delay and expense involved in the procedure, it still does not
accomplish its goals.
37
Foreign systems have, of course, made very different policy
judgments about the extent of discovery allowed in civil cases
and, in virtually all civil systems, have left the process in the
hands of judges rather than lawyers. 3 In France, for example,
blindman's buff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts
disclosed to the fullest practicable extent .. "); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 507 (1947) ("Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both
parties is essential to proper litigation."); see also Edward H. Cooper, Work
Product of the Rulesmakers, 53 MINN. L. REv. 1269, 1274 (1969) (analyzing the
Hickman decision).
137. As Justice Powell observed in his dissent to the 1980 amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
The present Rules ... invite discovery of such scope and duration that
district judges often cannot keep the practice within reasonable
bounds. Even in a relatively simple case, discovery through
depositions, interrogatories, and demands for documents may take
weeks. In complex litigation, discovery can continue for years. One
must doubt whether empirical evidence would demonstrate that
untrammeled discovery actually contributes to the just resolution of
disputes. If there is disagreement about that, there is none whatever
about the effect of discovery practices upon the average citizen's ability
to afford legal remedies .... Delay and excessive expense now
characterize a large percentage of all civil litigation. The problems arise
in significant part, as every judge and litigator knows, from abuse of the
discovery procedures available under the Rules.
446 U.S. 997, 999 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). With respect to the expense of
discovery, one 1997 survey of the Federal Judicial Center found that while in an
average case, discovery constituted about 50% of the total litigation cost, in the
95th percentile of cases, meaning those with discovery costs in the top 5%,
discovery accounted for 90% of the total litigation cost. Thomas E. Willging, et
al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993
Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 548 (1998); see also Arthur L.
Liman, The Quantum of Discovery v. The Quality of Justice: More Is Less, LITIG.
8, (Fall 1977). This is not to suggest that that there is unanimity of concern
about discovery excess. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of
Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REv. 683, 689 (1998) ("It is
difficult to get excited about rule reform when the data suggest that the best
prudential course is to do nothing.").
138. In the civil law system, pleadings are usually very general and discovery
nearly nonexistent. This is due to the fact that discovery and the introduction
of evidence are part of the same procedure. The case is generally dealt with in a
variety of appearances where the judicial officer hearing the evidence deals with
one aspect of the case at a time. Before the next appearance, there will be time
for the opposing side to prepare a response. In the civil law system, there will be
no surprise evidence because there is always an additional proceeding where
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the role of the parties is limited to supplying the court with the
evidence that the party intends to rely on, and to directing the
attention of the court to documents in their possession and in
the possession of the other party. Parties do exchange
evidentiary documents in advance of the proceeding, but they do
so under judicial supervision and there is no procedure for
requiring the production of documents from an adversary
without judicial intervention.139  With respect to third party
discovery, Article 138 of the Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile
permits discovery only of the documents that a party proposes to
use in a pending case, and the request goes to the judge, not the
witness or the opposing party.
140
Germany goes even further than most civil systems and vests
the judge with a very active role. Article 139 of the Civil
Procedure Code of Germany, Zivilprozessordnung, imposes a
duty on the judge rather than the parties to ensure that all
factual and legal positions are fully supported, to elaborate on
other evidence can be elicited through the judge's questioning. See JOHN HENRY
MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF
WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 111-123 (2d ed. 1985). By contrast,
discovery is necessary in common law systems, in order to eliminate surprise in
the trial proceeding. As Merryman observed: 'There is no necessity for pretrial
proceedings because there is no trial; in a sense every appearance in the first
two stages of a civil law proceeding has both trial and pretrial characteristics."
Id.
Andreas Lowenfeld has also stressed that the differences in procedure in
other countries, and particularly differences relative to the role of discovery,
have inevitably played out in "procedure neutral" tribunals, such as private
arbitration, to include the "better" features of American discovery. Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, An Introduction: The Elements of Procedure: Are They Separately
Portable?, 45 AM. J. COMP. LAw 649, 653 (1997). Such features include
ensuring that "relevant documents in the parties' possession or control ought to
be available to both sides and to the decision makers"; however, the
"extravagant aspects of American-style discovery" are simply not adopted or
used in international arbitration. Id. at 643-54: cf. generally Lisa Bernstein,
Law, Economics & Norms: Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the
Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765 (1996)
(tracing the reasons why specific industries and groups prefer dispute
resolution procedures tailored to the needs and structure of commercial
systems).
139. New Code of Civil Procedure and Related Laws, ch. I, arts. 132-137,
translated in FRENCH LAW: CONSTITUTION AND SELECTIVE LEGISLATION 7-30
(George A. Bermann, et al., eds., 1998) [hereinafter FRENCH LAW]. (The French
language original of the Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile is available at
<http: //www.legifrance.gouv.fr/citoyen/codeO3.ow?heure>).
140. Id. at 7-30 to -31 (translating Article 138).
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insufficient statements of fact and to indicate any doubts to the
parties. 141
One common and important factor in civil law litigation is that
when documents are produced, they are produced in the course
of the proceeding. In the interests of protecting the reliability of
the truth-finding process, parties are not permitted to pick and
choose what evidence the trier of fact will be allowed to consider.
There is no vehicle for allowing parties to inspect documents and
decide which shall or shall not be put into the record. Eliciting
evidence, whether in testimonial or documentary form, generally
puts it into the record.142 Thus, permitting a party to inspect
documents and later determine whether they will or will not
place them in evidence contradicts a core value of the civil law
litigation and national judgments about what best serves the
truth-finding process. 143 In drafting orders for discovery under §
141. Specifically, Article 139 of the Civil Procedure Code of Germany
provides:
(1) The presiding judge shall see to it that the parties make full
statements about all material facts and make appropriate motions,
especially to elaborate on insufficient statements regarding the facts
alleged and to indicate the means of proof. For this purpose, so far as
necessary, he shall discuss with the parties the case and issues, in
their factual and legal aspects, and ask questions.
(2) The presiding judge shall bring to the parties attention doubts that
the court has because of its duty to take certain points into account on
its own motion.
(3) He shall permit each member of the court to ask such questions as
that member requests.
Civil Proc. Code of Germany, art. 139, available at
<http://www.zivilprozessordnung.de/1.htm> (German version). Additionally,
Article 422 of the German Code of Civil Procedure provides that a party may be
compelled to furnish documentary evidence only if there is a substantive legal
obligation or the party being asked to furnish the evidence has relied on it in
support of the pleadings advanced in the case. Id. art. 422.
Germany, like France, requires litigants to identify the evidence on which they
intend to rely; discovery in an American form is simply unknown. In Germany,
parties cannot be forced to testify by their opponent, and the court will reject
the testimony of any witness who is listed simply for the purpose of finding out
what the witness knows about the case. See John C. Reitz, Why We Probably
Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 75 IowA L. REv. 987,
1001-05 (1990). For a complete comparison of the two systems, see David J.
Gerber, Extraterritorial Discovery and the Conflict of Procedural Systems:
Germany and the United States, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 745, 748-69 (1986).
142. FRENCH LAW, supra note 139, at 7-30 to -34 (translating Articles 132-
37, 146, 157, 160).
143. Lowenfeld, supra note 138, at 650 (stating that procedural mechanisms
resulting from deliberate decisions reflect "particular priorities, values, choices,
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1782, cooperative comity would dictate that judges make every
effort to accommodate those values.
D. The Difficulty of Finding and Evaluating Foreign Law Has
Been Exaggerated
A fourth argument I advance in support of my construction of
§ 1782 described in this article is that those courts and writings
that have assumed it would be too problematic for American
lawyers and judges to determine the discoverability of the
evidence in the foreign forum are, at this point in time, wrong.
The belief stated by the court in Eurormepa that "making the
extension of American assistance dependent on foreign law
would open a veritable Pandora's box" is incorrect.144  First,
presumably Professor Smit did not mean to discourage the
preliminary type of inquiry suggested by this article. Second,
with respect to gaining some knowledge of foreign law, at the
time the statute was drafted in 1964, Professor Smit's view may
have been well taken: Judicial research on any question of
foreign law was difficult and often required the costly and time
consuming appointment of a special master.
In the modem era, foreign law, or at least the nature of the
foreign legal system has become much easier to research. As
the citations in this article demonstrate, the laws of many
foreign countries are easily available on the worldwide web.
145
Further, district courts exercising discretion under § 1782 do
not need to master foreign law. Rather, they need only
understand the basic principles of discovery in the relevant
foreign system. The burden could easily be put on the parties to
brief the court about foreign law. In the rare case where this
inquiry proves troublesome, courts have a variety of procedures,
such as the letter rogatory, to communicate on these issues. 146
[and] perhaps political pressures"). This was the basis of the lower courts
opinion in Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 155 F.R.D. 80, 83 (S.D.N.Y.
1994), rev'd, 51 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1995).
144. Euromepa, 51 F.3d 1095, 1099 (quoting Smit, supra note 89, at 235).
145. See supra notes 139 & 141 and accompanying text.
146. The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence, opened for Signature,
Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into force Oct. 7,
1972) [hereinafter Hague Convention]. Article 1 of the Hague Convention
provides that in civil or commercial matters, courts may request the designated
Central Authority of another contracting state to use a letter of request either to
obtain evidence or do any other judicial act.
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Further, a requirement that district courts ask foreign litigants
to demonstrate the discoverability of the materials sought under
foreign law would harmonize the interpretation of § 1782 with
the approach of Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.14  Rule 44.1 provides that where a party intends to
rely on foreign law as the basis of a claim, the party must give
notice by pleadings or other reasonable written notice. It further
empowers the court to conduct its own independent research
and to consider any "relevant material or source.., whether or
not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules
of Evidence." 1
48
Similarly, in examining the scope of the forum non-conveniens
doctrine in a case where the alternative forum was foreign, the
Supreme Court, in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,149 held dismissal
was appropriate despite the fact foreign law was less favorable to
the plaintiff than the law of the American forum.1 50 The Court
noted, however, that "if the remedy provided by the alternative
forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no
remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law may be given
substantial weight .... If a decision about the merits of a
forum non-conveniens motion on occasion requires a
determination of a multiplicity of foreign law issues, this inquiry
is more sophisticated than the relatively simple determination of
147. FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (relating to proof of foreign law, as well as the
procedures that are necessitated in several other areas of transnational
litigation).
148. Id. Rule 44.1 is illustrative of the change in the way the American
judicial system has dealt with foreign law issues. The Supreme Court has long
rejected the provincial view that American courts should assume that foreign
law conformed to the law of the American forum. See Cuba R.R. Co. v. Crosby,
222 U.S. 473, 477-79 (1912). However, the approaches to the problem of
reliance on foreign law have caused varying responses. Half of the states have
statutes that address the question of whether the court may take judicial notice
of foreign law, or whether the parties must specifically invoke it. See Rudolph
B. Schlesinger, A Recurrent Problem in Transnational Litigation: The Effect of
Failure to Invoke or Prove the Applicable Foreign Law, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 6, 16
(1973); see generally supra note 42 and accompanying text.
149. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
150. Id. at 238, 261.
151. Id. at 254. At a minimum the court that is asked to dismiss will be
required to determine whether the defendant is amenable to service of process
under the laws of the foreign jurisdiction and whether the remedy offered by the
foreign forum is "clearly unsatisfactory." Id. at 254 n.22.
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foreign discovery procedures suggested here.15 2
This threshold inquiry would be no more difficult the one
involved when a court must determine the applicability of a
foreign privilege when requiring discovery from a foreign litigant
under Socit Nationale Industrielle A6rospatio-le.5 3 In that case,
the Supreme Court was confronted with an argument by a
French defendant subject to personal jurisdiction in the United
States, that discovery of documents in France should adhere to
the procedures in the Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters. 54 The court
rejected that argument, holding that discovery could proceed
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but noted: "American
courts should ... take care to demonstrate due respect for any
special problem confronted by the foreign litigant on account of
its nationality or the location of its operations, and for any
sovereign interest expressed by a foreign state." 55 If courts are
able to make these inquiries in the A~rospatiale context, why not
under § 1782?
It is not, in short, unusual or unduly burdensome for courts to
confront foreign law issues. They do so frequently in far more
challenging contexts, the most difficult of all being cases where
foreign law supplies the rule of decision. 56  In the § 1782
scenario, the burden imposed upon a district court to exercise
discretion when presented with a § 1782 discovery request need
not be a substantial one. District courts could simply ask the
152. In the famous case involving Union Carbide's plant disaster in India, the
district court in New York's decision to grant forum non conveniens motion was
reversed on the stipulation that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would
govern the discovery in India. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster,
809 F.2d 195, 205-06 (3d Cir. 1987). The Second Circuit found this condition
too broad and beyond the power of the American court. See id.
153. 482 U.S. 522 (1987). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
acknowledged that comity must be considered when the discovery would be
privileged in the foreign litigation.
154. Id. at 524-26; see also Hague Convention, supra note 146. Both France
and the United States are parties to the Convention. See id.
155. Societ6 Nationale, 482 U.S. at 546.
156. See, e.g., Itar-Tass Russ' News Agency v. Russ' Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d
82, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying Russian and American law to varying issues
in the case). Modem choice of law rules often require courts to apply the laws
of multiple states, depending on the laws applicable to different claims and
issues, a practice known as dpe~age. See generally Willis L.M. Reese,
D~pevage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 58
(1973) (providing an elaborate discussion of ddpegage).
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foreign litigant or "interested party" petitioning for discovery in
the United States to make a prima facie showing that the
material would be discoverable in the foreign proceeding.
Parties opposing discovery would be permitted to rebut that
evidence, and the court, consistent with the approach
envisioned under Federal Rules 44.1, would also be free to
engage in its own research. Rule 44.1 has presented few
practical difficulties, and, for this reason, provides a workable
model for § 1782 proceedings. 5
E. American Discovery Is an Unlikely Export
Finally, if the aim of § 1782 is, as the Euromepa line of cases
suggests, to evangelize and introduce the rest of the world to the
American method of discovery in the hope that, to quote
Professor Smit, "the United States would communicate to the
world at large what it regarded as the proper example to emulate
in extending international cooperation .... " the invitation has
been declined."5 8 Foreign procedural systems and international
arbitrators alike have consistently rejected American
discovery.
1 5 9
An illustration of the chasm between American procedure and
that of other countries is found in the multinational responses
to the Hague Evidence Convention, noted above in conjunction
with A~rospatiale. The Convention establishes a framework for
facilitating extraterritorial discovery requests. Article 23
157. The court may, for example, consider expert testimony. See, e.g., Diaz
v. S.E. Drilling Co., 324 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Tex. 1969), affd, 449 F.2d 258 (5th
Cir. 1971). The court may also conduct its own research into the proper
translation and interpretation of the foreign text. In Eastern Airlines v. Floyd,
499 U.S. 530 (1991), for example, Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court
contained an extensive discussion of the translation and interpretation of the
French phrase for bodily injury, lesion corporelle. Id. at 536-46. The method of
interpreting foreign law has spawned an extensive literature. See generally
Andrew N. Adler, Translating and Interpreting Foreign Statutes, 19 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 37 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165
(1993). Another avenue open to the court is the appointment of a special
master pursuant to Rule 53. FED. R. Clv. P. 53.
158. Smit, supra note 84, at 235; see also supra notes 95-106 and
accompanying text (providing discussion of Euromepa).
159. "No aspect of the extension of the American legal system beyond the
territorial frontier of the United States has given rise to so much friction as the
request for documents associated with investigation and litigation in the United
States." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 442, reporters' note 1 (1987).
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provides: "A Contracting State may at the time of signature,
ratification or accession, declare that it will not execute Letters
of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery
of documents as known in Common Law countries.,,160  This
provision was included in order to gain the Convention's
acceptance by civil law nations with a deep aversion to American
document discovery. The inclusion of Article 23, and the fact
that nearly all the signatories did declare their unwillingness to
participate in document discovery, is again illustrative of the
deeply held beliefs in foreign legal systems about the disruptive
effect of American document discovery. 1
61
While there is much to be said for the truth-producing and
field leveling goals of American discovery, there is no aspect of
American procedure that has generated and continues to
generate so many calls for reform. 1 2 It is reasonable to ask why
American courts should, as a matter of course, allow discovery
to foreign litigants under § 1782, when most other countries
have chosen not to follow the American example, and when the
model has far from unanimous support even in the United
States.
F. Conclusion: Other Applications for Cooperative Comity
In conclusion, unquestionably, the text and legislative history
160. Hague Convention, supra note 146, at art. 23.
161. Twenty-three countries are signatories to the Convention: Argentina,
Australia, Barbados, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, Monaco,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom, and the United States. Only Barbados, the Czech Republic,
the Slovak Republic, and the United States will unreservedly execute requests
for production of documents. Mexico will execute such requests under certain
conditions. The reservations of the parties may be found in the notes following
28 U.S.C. § 1781 (Supp. 1999).
162. See generally Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C.
L. REv. 747 (1998) (sketching the history of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure). Numerous articles have evaluated proposals for discovery reform.
See, e.g., William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A
Blueprint for the Judicial System in the Twenty-first Century, 76 F.R.D. 277
(1977) (tracing the history of reform of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); John
H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823
(1985) (analyzing the introduction of German discovery procedures of allowing
the judge to investigate facts into American discovery methods); Marcus, supra
note 135, at 153 (1999) (discussing the American discovery transformation in
the Twenty-First century).
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of § 1782 make it clear that where a foreign court asks for
assistance in obtaining evidence in the United States, both the.
text of the Act, the legislative history and notions of cooperative
comity should suggest that a court should render all possible
assistance to the foreign tribunal.1 63 Where, however, it is a
foreign litigant who is requesting the American court's assistance
in obtaining discovery, arguments informed by a comity-driven
reading of the statute would suggest that the U.S. court
supports the rules, policies, and values of the foreign procedure
and not accord discovery prohibited abroad.
64
This model of cooperative comity has applications in a variety
of other procedural contexts. In the case of forum non-
conveniens inquiries, for example, courts, including courts
considering dismissals in favor of foreign forums, have been
instructed to weigh the possibility of a dismissal under both
public and private factors. The private factors would remain
unchanged by a cooperative comity analysis and include ease of
access to proof, the availability and cost of obtaining witnesses,
and "all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious, and inexpensive."'165  The public factors have
163. See, e.g., In re Letter Rogatory From First Ct., 42 F.3d at 310-11 (5th
Cir. 1995) (stating that the fear of offending a forum nation does not exist when
a foreign court requests information because that court arbitrates the
procedural rules regarding discovery). In light of this observation, it is
especially puzzling as to why the Fifth Circuit has not imposed a discoverability
requirement where the request comes from a foreign litigant.
164. Another aspect which has spawned disagreement and which likewise
implicates comity concerns is the statutory requirement that the discovery be
sought for use in a foreign proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (Supp. 2000).
Generally, courts have required that there be a foreign adjudicative proceeding
pending. See, e.g., Lancaster Factoring Co. v. Mangone, 90 F.3d 38, 41 (2d Cir.
1996). In the alternative, courts have required that "adjudicative proceedings
be imminent-very likely to occur and very soon to occur." In re Request for
Int'l Judicial Assistance for the Federative Republic of Brazil, 936 F.2d 702, 706
(2d Cir. 1991); see also In re Al Fayed v. United States, 210 F.3d 421, 424 (4th
Cir. 2000) (denying discovery assistance under § 1782 to obtain documents in
the hands of the National Security Administration pertaining to the car accident
that killed Dodi Al Fayed and Princess Diana, on the grounds that where the
applicant was appealing the determination of a French magistrate investigating
the accident, there was no proceeding within the meaning of the statute).
Under a cooperative comity model the question of whether something is or is
not an adjudicative proceeding should be determined under the law of the
foreign country where the putative proceeding is pending.
165. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981) (quoting Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)).
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included the administrative problems associated with court
congestion, and the avoidance of unnecessary application of
conflict of law problems and application of foreign law.166 In
Piper Aircraft, the Court included the interests of the foreign
forum as a part of the analysis. 1 7  An even more useful
formulation of the Piper Aircraft test would be to include in the
list of public factors an identification of the interests of the
foreign forum, including its interests in trying a local case local
and application of local procedures.
Another context ripe for a more sophisticated cooperative
comity approach remains the problem of duplicative litigation in
the courts of different countries. Historically, these cases have
been resolved too often by either staying the later filed action,
thereby rewarding the winner of the race to the courthouse, or
by an unseemly battle between courts dueling for jurisdiction of
the case.' 68 In this and many other circumstances of potential
conflicts between American and foreign courts, a recognition of
cooperative comity is an important value and will facilitate more
efficient, more cordial, and more harmonious decisions. Comity
can be a device that enables judges to understand, to
communicate and -true to the Sanskrit derivation of the word
"comity,"-to smile.
III. OTHER DIRECTIONS: INTEGRATIVE COMITY AND THE RELATIONSHIP
OF AMERICAN COURTS TO INTERNATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL
TRIBUNALS
Having explored the function of cooperative comity, applicable
when American courts are in horizontal conflict with the courts
of sister nations, I now come to another possible application of
judicial comity, specifically, the role of comity in cases where the
decisions of American courts intersect with the subject matter of
cases before international and supranational tribunals. Because
there are far fewer international tribunals than courts of sister
nations, this problem by its very nature arises less frequently.
Further, because the jurisdiction of most international and
supranational tribunals is strictly circumscribed and agreed to
in the forms of treaties or consents by nation states, the
166. Id.
167. Id. at 260.
168. See generally supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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potential for conflict between domestic and international
tribunals in the past has been more limited. The International
Court of Justice (ICJ), for example, provides only two types of
jurisdiction: the power to decide contentious cases based on
Article 36 of the Court's Statute;1 69 and, the authority to render
advisory opinions at the request of either the General Assembly
or the Security Council of the United Nations pursuant to Article
96 of the U.N. Charter.170  Thus, the occasions for conflict
between American courts and the ICJ prove rare.
The number of supranational tribunals, however, is growing.
These tribunals include the Dispute Settlement Bodies of the
World Trade Organization (WTO),' 71 the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights,1 2 the dispute resolution mechanisms under
Chapters 11, 19, and 20 of NAFTA,17 3 and, should the United
States ratify the Rome Treaty, the International Criminal
Court. 174
169. The Statute of the Int'l Ct. of Justice (ICJ), (June 26, 1945, art. 36,
para. 1), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060.
170. U.N. CHARTER art. 96, para. 1.
171. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2d ed. 1997) (stating that
pursuant to a treaty, these bodies placed the WTO in a position of supremacy
with respect to the global trading network); John H. Jackson, The Legal
Meaning of a GATT Dispute Settlement Report: Some Reflections, in TOWARDS
MORE EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Niels Blokker &
Sam Muller, eds. 1994); see also generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION (Terence P. Stewart, ed. 1996).
172. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 34-40,
available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/BC3%/Alsicos/basic3.htm> (last
visited May 22, 2001).
173. See generally David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Lessons
From the Early Experience, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 163 (1997) (describing NAFI'A's
proscribed dispute resolution process): Robert Lutz, Law, Procedure and Culture
in Mexico Under the NAFTA: The Perspective of a NAFTA Panelist, 3 Sw. J.L. &
TRADE AM. 391 (1996). For a recent decision under NAFTA holding that the
United States has acted improperly in denying entry to all Mexican trucking
services, see NAFTA Arbitration Panel, In re Cross Border Trucking Services,
USAMEX No. 98-2008-01 (Feb. 6, 2001).
174. See Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998); see generally Bartram S.
Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National
Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383 (1998);
Diane F. Orentlicher, Politics By Any Other Means: the Law of the International
Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 489 (1999); Leila Nadya Sadat & S.
Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution,
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Legal analysis by U.S. courts remains in a nascent state of
development due to the courts' relative lack of experience in
blending and accommodating the decisions of domestic and
international tribunals. 7 5  Thus, a proposal for integrative
comity provides a model in the formative process. Therefore, it
is not necessary to examine effective international and
supranational adjudication, 76 the constitutional impediments to
ceding jurisdiction to supranational tribunals,'7 7 the much larger
tensions between sovereignty and international law, 78 nor the
dualist posture of the United States towards international law.
88 GEO. L.J. 381 (2000); cf David A. Wirth, Reexamining Decision-Making
Processes in International Environmental Law, 79 IOWA L. REV. 769, 780-90
(1994).
175. The experience we have to date includes the Breard and Federal
Republic of Germany cases. See Fed. Republic of Germany v. United States, 526
U.S. 111 (1999); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998); see also generally Lori
Fisler Damrosch, The Justiciability of Paraguay's Claim of Treaty Violation, 92
AM. J. INT'L L. 697 (1998); Louis Henkin, Provisional Measures, U.S. Treaty
Obligations and the States, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 679 (1998); Frederic L. Kirgis,
Zschernig v. Miller and the Breard Matter, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 704 (1998); Jordan
J. Paust, Breard and the Treaty-Based Rights Under the Consular Convention, 92
AM. J. INT'L L. 691 (1998); Henry J. Richardson 1II, The Execution of Angel
Breard by the United States: Violating an Order of the International Court of
Justice, 12 TEMPLE INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 121 (1998); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Court
to Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 708 (1998); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Breard and the
Federal Power to Require Compliance with ICJ Orders of Provisional Measures,
92 AM. J. INT'L L. 683; A. Mark Weisburd, International Courts and American
Courts, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 877 (2000); Shana F. Marbury, Note, Breard v.
Greene: International Human Rights and the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, 7 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 505 (1999).
176. E.g., Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of
Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997); Harold Hong)u
Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996) [hereinafter Koh,
Legal Process].
177. See Brian F. Havel, The Constitution in an Era of Supranational
Adjudication, 78 N.C. L. REV. 257, 290-361 (2000); cf. Eric Stein, Lawyers,
Judges, and the Meaning of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 1
(1981); J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991)
(examining supranational adjudication in non-U.S. contexts).
178. See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995)
(noting that despite a lack of coercive measure in most treaties, there is a
reasonable empirical level of compliance). But see George W. Downs, David M.
Rocke, & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the Good News About Compliance Good News
About Cooperation?, 50 INT'L ORG. 379, 384 (1996) (arguing that treaties need
sanctions because nations otherwise have a self interest in noncompliance).
See generally Luzius Wildhaber, Sovereignty and International Law, in THE
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 425 (R. St. J. Macdonald &
Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983).
Models of International Judicial Comity
A model of integrative comity will be useful to harmonize
conflicts between international and domestic courts, despite the
model's theoretical and doctrinal problems. A historical
difference of opinion exists as to how courts should treat
conflicts between international law and domestic law. In many
legal systems outside the United States, "law" is a unitary
concept, requiring the harmonization of international and
domestic law. Since only one law can dictate a particular
circumstance, many legal systems give international law
primacy, often through an express constitutional mandate.
79
This concept reflects a monist philosophy.
The United States, by contrast, is a dualist system that
considers international and domestic law as separate, except to
the extent that international law is enacted as a part of domestic
law.' ° In dualist systems, if an international law conflicts with
179. For example, in Germany, Article 25 of the Basic Law provides that
"[tihe general rules of international law . . . shall override laws and directly
establish rights and obligations for the inhabitants of the federal territory."
Gisbert H. Flanz, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 117 (Albert P.
Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1994) (translating Article 25 of the
Grudgesetz or Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany). Two scholars
have observed that "the general rules of international law are norms which are
recognized as binding by a predominant majority of countries (but not
necessarily by the FRG itself)." Wildhaber & Breitenmoser, The Relationship
Between Customary International Law and Municipal Law in Western European
Countries, 48 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 163,
179-204 (1988), translated in LOUIS HENKIN, RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, OSCAR
SCHACHTER, & HANS SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 154-55 (3d
ed. 1993).
Other countries follow a similar approach. The Greek Constitution of 1975
provides that "[the generally acknowledged rules of international law, as well as
international conventions as of the time they are sanctioned by law and become
operative according to the conditions therein shall be an integral part of
domestic Greek law and shall prevail over any contrary provision of the law."
GISBERT H. FLANZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 26 (Louis
Pagonis trans., Gisbert H. Flanz, ed. 1988) (translating Article 28(1) of the
Constitution of 1975 of the Greek Republic). The Russian Federation goes the
farthest of all, providing for supremacy of customary norms, peremptory norms,
and treaty obligations over domestic law. It provides that "[11f an international
treaty of the Russian Federation establishes rules other than those stipulated
by the law, the rules of the international treaty apply." Constitution of 1993 of
the Russian Federation, translation in British Broadcasting Corporation,
Summary of World Broadcasts, Nov. 11, 1993.
180. E.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-32
(1998). Others have argued that the rigid dichotomy of the monist-dualist
debate is not helpful. E.g., Edwin Borchard, The Relation Between International
Law and Municipal Law, 27 VA. L. REv. 137, 143-44 (1940) (arguing that the
20011 637
Catholic University Law Review
domestic legislation, the courts will enforce the domestic law,
and attempt to harmonize the constructions by recognizing that
"international law is part of our law."'
8
'
The constant tension between the dictates of international and
domestic law has produced profuse commentary by
international lawyers and political scientists alike, yet this
attention has failed to create a workable model for the courts. 82
Perhaps the problem was never more squarely presented than in
the 1889 Chinese Exclusion Case.183 Here, the Supreme Court
held that the Constitution does not prohibit the enactment of
laws inconsistent with international obligations and that the
courts shall enforce an act of Congress that is inconsistent with
an earlier treaty. 84
Due to this unsteady platform for reconciling international and
domestic legal norms, the relationship between domestic and
international tribunals also rests on a tenuous foundation. The
United States' constitutional structure developed at a time when
today's internationalism and the United States' rile as the
international economic leader could not have been foreseen.
85
domestic mechanisms employed to perform international obligations are not of
international concern, and that states that do not conform to international
obligations are simply in violation of international law). For an interesting
perspective on how monism and dualism have been viewed in other disciplines,
see Jean Bethke Elshtain, How Should We Talk, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731,
732 (1999) (characterizing liberal monism in the theologian's church-state
debate as "the view that all institutions internal to a democratic society must
conform to a single authority principle . .. and to a single vocabulary of political
discussion").
181. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 683 (1900).
182. See generally Louis HENKIN. How NATIONS BEHAVE (2d ed. 1979); THOMAS
M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INrERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 26 (1995) (stating
that international law needs the voluntary compliance of the various powers
because of "the relative paucity of modes of compulsion"); Edwin D. Dickinson,
The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA.
L. REV. 26 (1952); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?,
106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) [hereinafter Koh, International Law].
183. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
184. Id. at 602. For an excellent commentary on the case, see Louis Henkin,
The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion
and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987).
185. E.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). Justice Holmes explains
that "when we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the
Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life
a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by
the most gifted of its begetters." Id. at 433.
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The relationship between American courts and international
courts is of a different nature and quality than the relationship
between American courts and the courts of other nations.
International law binds all nations, even where domestic norms
are given precedence within a domestic system.
These conflicts could be resolved by a vertical model of
integrative comity that would direct the courts' analysis in the
event of a conflict between domestic and international law. This
model would mandate that where American courts are
confronted with a decision of the ICJ or other international
tribunal, and where the United States has consented to the
jurisdiction of that tribunal, American courts should accord a
high degree of comity, deference, and respect for that court and
should generally aid it in protection of its jurisdiction and
enforcement of its judgments unless to do so would violate a
clear and express constitutional or statutory prohibition under
U.S. law. This degree of deference is necessary because
international dispute resolution cannot function if nations
cannot predict and rely upon other nations to abide by
international obligations created by an international tribunal. 
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Two cases serve to illustrate the current interactions between
the International Court of Justice and the United States
Supreme Court and how comity could have eliminated conflict.
The first case concerned an execution by the State of Virginia of
a Paraguayan national named Angel Francisco Breard. 8 7 The
186. Koh, International Law, supra note 182, at 2600 (stating that if nations
carry out their international legal obligations erratically, it will be impossible to
achieve "multilateralism" as opposed to the current regime of bipolar politics).
187. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998). The Breard case arose when
Angel Breard was arrested for the murder and attempted rape of Ruth Dickie in
Arlington County, Virginia. Breard, by his own testimony, was in fact guilty of
the crimes. At his trial, Breard testified, against the advice of counsel, that he
had accosted Dickie on the street, followed her to her apartment, argued with
her, gained entry to the apartment, stabbed her, and got "on top of her" in an
attempt to have sex. Breard v. Virginia, 445 S.E.2d 670, 674 (Va. 1994).
Before he could complete the act, he was frightened by a knock on tie door and
subsequently fled through a kitchen window. Id. Breard was arrested some
months later in conjunction with another attempted rape, and was tried with
the Dickie murder after DNA analysis connected his hair, blood, and body fluids
to those found at the scene. Id. His conviction was affirmed and his state
habeus corpus petition was denied. Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed
the conviction, the constitutionality of the trial court's review of the death
sentence, and addressed various other matters relating to the conduct of the
trial. Id. at 674-82. The United States Supreme Court denied Breard's petition
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second case concerned the execution by the State of Arizona of
two German nationals, Karl and Walter LaGrand.'88 Both cases
involved an arrest, trial, and conviction that occurred without
notifying the accused of his rights as a foreign national under
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations' 9 to contact his
consulate and obtain assistance. In both cases there was little
doubt about the guilt of the accused. The governments of the
accused learned of the convictions only after the appeals were
exhausted.' 90 The governments sought relief in the United
for a write of certiorari. Breard v. Virginia, 513 U.S. 971 (1994). The Circuit
Court of Arlington County denied his state petition for habeus corpus, and the
Supreme Court of Virginia refused the petition for appeal. Breard v. Netherland,
949 F. Supp. 1255, 1260 (E.D. Va. 1996). See Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (Paraguay v. United States), Order of 10 Nov. 1998, 1 C.J. Reports
1998, at 426.
188. Fed. Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999). The
LaGrand brothers were sentenced to death in conjunction with first degree
murder, attempted murder, attempted robbery, and kidnapping convictions
arising out of an attempted bank robbery. Arizona v. LaGrand, 734 P.2d 563,
565 (Ariz. 1987). The LaGrands were never notified by the authorities of their
rights under the Vienna Convention, although the authorities were aware of
their German nationality in 1982. Id. The LaGrands never raised the failure to
accord them their rights under the Consular Convention during the trial and
appellate phases of the proceeding. See Cara S. O'Driscoll, Comment, The
Execution of Foreign Nationals in Arizona: Violations of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, 32 ARIZ. ST. L. REv. 323, 331-32 (2000); see also Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (Germany v. United States), Order of 5 Mar.
1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999.
189. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
101, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 292. Article 36(1)(b) of the Convention provides:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating
to nationals of the sending state:
(B) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State
shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if,
within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any
other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by
the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be
forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities
shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this
sub-paragraph.
Id. The Convention entered into force on March 19, 1967. The United States,
Paraguay, and Germany are all parties.
190. Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Va. 1996), affd, 134
F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998). In 1996, after the Virginia Supreme Court refused
Breard's petition for appeal, Breard filed a federal proceeding raising, among
other things, Virginia's failure to advise of his rights under Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention. Id. at 1260. At some point in 1996, the Paraguayan
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States' legal system and before the ICJ.' 91 In both cases, shortly
before the scheduled execution, the ICJ issued identical orders
as Provisional Measures stating that "[tihe United States should
take all measures at its disposal to ensure that [the defendant]
is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings,
and should inform the Court of all measures which it has taken
in implementation of this Order."'9 2 In Germany v. United States,
the ICJ also ordered that "[tihe Government of the United States
of America should transmit this Order to the Governor of the
State of Arizona.' 93 The ICJ also noted that "the Governor of
Arizona is under the obligation to act in conformity with the
international undertakings of the United States."
94
In the Supreme Court proceedings, the Department of State
and the Department of Justice submitted an amicus brief to the
Court arguing against the stay. With respect to the ICJ's interim
government became aware of the conviction and sentence and held a series of
meetings with the United States State Department. On July 7, 1997, the State
Department acknowledged the breach of the Convention and apologized for it.
See Brief of Amicus Curiae for the United States, at 8-9, Breard v. Greene, 523
U.S. 371 (1998). The Paraguayan consulate instituted an action, also in the
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, seeking a declaration that the
Vienna Convention and the Parguay-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation had been violated. The consulate also sought an injunction against
further violations, and an order vacating Breard's conviction and sentence. The
court found that the ambassador had standing, but concluded that the
Eleventh Amendment precluded the court's assumption of subject matter
jurisdiction. Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1996),
affd, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub norn, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S.
371 (1998).
Meanwhile, in Breard's federal habeus proceeding, the district court held that
Breard had waived this claim because he failed to raise it during the state trial,
appellate, and habeus proceedings. The court did note, however, that it was
"troubled" by what it characterized as "Virginia's persistent refusal to abide by
the Vienna Convention." Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998).
Ultimately the appeals were exhausted and Breard's execution date was set. In
the LaGrand case, during the pendency of a Mercy Committee hearing in
Arizona, the German government used diplomatic means to prevent the
execution of Karl LaGrand, including demands for a stay of execution from the
Chancellor and president of Germany. They were not successful and Karl
LaGrand was executed the day after the meeting. See O'Driscoll, supra note
188, at 332.
191. Germany v. United States, 38 I.L.M. 308, 313 (1999); Paraguay v.
United States, 37 I.L.M. 810, 819 (1998).
192. Germany, 38 I.L.M. at 313 (indicating provisional measures); Paraguay,
37 I.L.M. at 819 (indicating provisional measures).
193. Germany, 38 I.L.M. at 313.
194. Id.
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measures order, the departments argued that "there is
substantial disagreement among jurists as to whether an ICJ
order indicating provisional measures is binding."95 This was
based on the fact that Article 41 of the ICJ Statute, relating to
Provisional Measure, was not couched in mandatory terms. The
brief contended:
The better-reasoned position is that such an order is not
binding. Article 41(1) of the ICJ statute provides that the
ICJ shall have the power to indicate any provisional
measures which ought to be taken to preserve the
respective rights of either [party.] Article 41(2) further
states that "pending the final decision [of the ICJ], notice
of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to
the parties and the Security Council.' 96
Nevertheless, the Court denied Breard's petition for a stay,
dismissed the petition for a writ of certiorari, and held that
neither Paraguay nor the Consul General of Paraguay were
authorized to bring suit.197 In a per curiam opinion, from which
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented, the Court first
noted that while it would always give "respectful consideration"
to treaties such as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and
Consular Relations, the implementation of treaties was generally
governed by the procedural rules of the forum state, which in
this case was the United States. 98 Since Breard failed to raise
his rights under the Vienna Convention in state court, he waived
the claims. '99  Further, the Court noted that while the
Constitution recognizes treaties such as the Vienna Convention
as the law of the land under the Supremacy Clause, acts of
Congress are deemed to be in full parity.200 The Court concluded
that Breard could not raise the claim of prejudice resulting from
the failure to advise him of his rights under the Consular
Convention since he failed to develop that claim in the state
195. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 49-50, Breard v. Greene,
523 U.S. 371 (1998) (Nos. 97-1390 & 97-8214).
196. Id.
197. Breard, 523 U.S. at 372, 378-79.
198. Id. at 375.
199. Id. at 375-76.
200. Id. at 376 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (stating that
"when a statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the
statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty null").
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proceedings."'
As to the question of the ICJ Order, the Court said only this:
It is unfortunate that this matter comes before us while
proceedings are pending before the ICJ that might have
been brought to that court earlier. Nonetheless, this
Court must decide questions presented to it on the basis
of law. The Executive Branch, on the other hand, in
exercising its authority over foreign relations may, and
in this case did, utilize diplomatic discussion with
Paraguay. Last night the Secretary of State sent a letter
to the Governor of Virginia requesting that he stay
Breard's execution. If the Governor wishes to wait for
the decision of the ICJ, that is his prerogative. 2
The day before the Supreme Court decision, Secretary of State
Madeline Albright sent a letter asking the Governor of Virginia to
stay the execution. 3 She noted that although the Department
of State defended Virginia's right to proceed with the sentence in
both the ICJ and the Supreme Court, the execution presented
difficult foreign policy issues. While acknowledging the
"aggravated character of the crime for which Mr. Breard has
been convicted, 2 0 4 she noted that the execution of Breard would
cause other countries to argue that the United States did not
take its obligations under the Convention seriously and "could
be seen as a denial by the United States of the significance of
international law.., and thereby limit our ability to endure that
Americans are protected when living or traveling abroad., 2°5 In
the end, however, the Governor of Virginia refused to stay the
execution, noting that the ICJ did not have the authority to
interfere in the criminal justice system of Virginia, that Breard's
guilt was beyond question, and that the crime had been heinous
and depraved.2 6
201. See id. at 376-77.
202. Id. at 378.
203. Letter from Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, to James S.
Gilmore I1, Governor of Virginia (Apr. 13, 1998), reprinted in Curtis A. Bradley
& Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance of Federalism in U.S. Foreign
Relations, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 666, 671-672 (1998).
204. Id. at 672.
205. Id.
206. Commonwealth of Virginia, Office of the Governor, Press Office,
Statement by Governor Jim Gilmore Concerning the Execution of Angel Breard
(Apr. 14, 1998).
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The Supreme Court's response to the ICJ order in LaGrand
was even more terse. The actions were filed by the German
government in both the ICJ and the Supreme Court on the day
set for LaGrand's execution. The ICJ issued its Order, based
upon Germany's ex parte application and the United States had
not had an opportunity to respond . The German action in the
United States Supreme Court invoked the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court under Article III, section 2, vesting original
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court in cases affecting
ambassadors, ministers, and consuls.08  In rejecting the
German government's petition for relief, the Court noted first
that original jurisdiction would apply only to claims on behalf of
ambassadors and consuls, and not to their claims relating to the
treatment of German nationals.2 0 9  The Court also noted the
Eleventh Amendment difficulties in allowing a suit against the
210State of Arizona to be brought in federal court. Ironically, on
the same day, the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency
recommended a reprieve so that Germany would have more time
to pursue its case before the ICJ, but the Governor, Jane Hull,
rejected the recommendation and Walter LaGrand was executed
in the gas chamber the same day. 1
The ICJ hearings in Germany v. United States were conducted
between November 13th and 18th, 2000.212 First, Germany
argued that the United States violated its legal obligations by not
informing the LaGrands of their rights under Article 36 of the
Consular Convention, thus depriving Germany of its right to
provide consular assistance.1 3 Second, Germany argued that
207. Germany, 38 I.L.M. at 308; see also id. at 315-16 (Separate Opinion of
President Schwebel) (noting the limited nature of the Court's power to issue ex
parte provisional measures).
208. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
209. See Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 112 (1999).
210. Id. at 112.
211. O'Driscoll, supra note 188, at 334 (citing Jerry Kammer & Mary Beth
Warner, Germans Knock U.S. Justice: Media, Citizens Decry Death as Form of
Punishment, Criticize Hull, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 4, 1999, at A2 (quoting the
State Department as saying "Germany has known about the consular
notification issue for a number of years but did not raise it with us until very
recently")).
212. The text of the oral hearings, written pleadings, and other case
materials is available at the ICJ web site. See ICJ, http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm.
213. Id. at Verbatim Record 2000/2 6-Translation.
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when the United States applied its domestic law of procedural
default and waiver, it violated its obligation to Germany to give
full legal effect to the object and purposes for which Article 36
was intended.21 4  Finally, Germany argued that the United
States' refusal to take all measures necessary to comply with the
ICJ order and to prevent the execution of Walter LaGrand
violated international law.21 Germany then sought an order
from the ICJ to ensure that the United States provide Germany
with assurances that the referenced unlawful acts would not be
repeated.21 6 The United States, conversely, sought an order in
which the ICJ would acknowledge that the United States had
breached its legal obligations and apologized to Germany, thus
217dismissing all other claims.
The ICJ's decision shall first address the question of the
mandatory nature of the ICJ's power, at least with respect to its
power to order provisional measures. Second, the opinions are
likely to address the extent to which the domestic law of a state,
in this case procedural law relating to waiver of criminal
defenses not raised at trial, and the nature of the federative
structure of the state, may relieve the state of its obligation to
comply with orders of the ICJ.
There are many troubling aspects to the Breard and LaGrand
decisions, which have already drawn considerable and able
scholarly comment.21 8 One of the most significant questions is
whether a conviction based on evidence obtained in the face of a
clear violation of a treaty obligation should stand. 2 9 This issue
214. Id. at Verbatim Record 2000/2 7-Translation.
215. See i.
216. Id.
217. Id. at Verbatim Record 2000/2 8-Translation.
218. See, e.g., supra note 153.
219. Most cases conclude that these convictions are valid. See, e.g., United
States v. Jimenez-Nava, No. 99-11300, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2766 (5th Cir.
Feb. 26, 2001) (holding that suppressing evidence in a criminal trial did not
further the purposes of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations); United
States v. Santos, 235 F.3d. 1105 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that defendant had
five months to exercise his right to consular participation and his failure to do
so cannot be charged to defects in the government's procedure); United States
v. Lawal, 231 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that exclusion of evidence was
not a proper remedy for a violation of defendant's right under the Vienna
Convention to be informed of a right to contact the consul); United States v.
Lombera-Comorlinga, 206 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a violation of
the Vienna Convention's consular notification requirement does not require
suppression of subsequently obtained evidence); United States v. Nai Fook Li,
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is further complicated by the difficulties posed by America's
dualist posture. One perceptive commentator observed:
[We may] proceed[] on the assumption that the ICJ order
involved in the Breard case was binding as a matter of
international law. Based on this assumption, the United
States as an entity was obliged to obey the ICJ order,
incurring international responsibility if it failed to do so.
It does not follow, however, that this international legal
obligation required American courts to carry out the
ICJ's order. The fact that the United States had an
obligation does not indicate which officials within the
federal and state governments had the responsibility of
implementing the obligation.220
Another commentator argued that, "[almong the most puzzling
aspects of the Breard episode was the Clinton administration's
claim that the decision whether or not to comply with the Order
of the International Court of Justice... lay exclusively in the
hands of the Governor of Virginia."221 It is, after all, understood
that "a state cannot plead its own law as an excuse for
noncompliance with international law .. 222
Certainly the optimal solution would be the harmonization of
international law and domestic law. This involves the timeless
223tension between international law and sovereignty. This
solution seeks the end of religious and nationalistic tensions,
clean and pure sources of energy, universal shelter, food, and
206 F.3d 56 (lst Cir. 2000) (holding that regardless of whether the treaties
created rights to consular notification and access, failure to notify defendant of
the right does not result in suppression of evidence); Faulder v. Scott, 81 F.3d
515 (5th Cir. 1996). But see Delaware v. Reyes, 740 A.2d 7, 14 (Del. 1999)
(holding that statement made during interrogation suppressed due to failure to
advise foreign national defendant of his rights under the Vienna Convention),
appeal denied, No. 527, 2000 Del. LEXIS 492 (Dec. 12, 2000).
220. Weisburd, supra note 175, at 882 (emphasis added).
221. Carlos Manuel V6zquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require
Compliance with ICJ Orders of Provisional Measures, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 683
(1998).
222. Louis HENKIN, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 149 (3d
ed. 1993).
223. Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 39, 43 (Apr. 9)
(stating that, "[wie can no longer regard sovereignty as an absolute and
individual right of every State, as used to be done under the old law founded on
the individualist regime, according to which States were only bound by the
rules which they had accepted."); Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 17 (2d ed.
1979) (noting that "[eixcept as limited by international law or treaty, a nation is
master in its own territory").
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health care. It is unlikely this goal will be achieved in our
lifetimes.
For these goals to be achieved U.S. courts must show the ICJ
and other international and supranational tribunals a more
developed sense of comity. The United States recognizes the
ICJ's jurisdiction as a judicial body established within the U.N.
224Charter to resolve disputes between nation-states.
Nevertheless, there may be a question about whether the ICJ's
authority to grant provisional remedies is drafted in permissive
224. Article 36(1) of the Statute of the ICJ refers to the non-compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court and provides: 'The jurisdiction of the Court comprises
all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specifically provided for in
the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties or conventions in force." The
United States recognizes such jurisdiction. Article 36(2) of the Statute of the
ICJ provides that:
[States may] declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and
without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the
same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court to hear legal disputes
concerning: (a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) any question of
international law; (c) the existence of any fact which, if established,
would constitute breach of an international obligation; [and] (d) the
nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation.
Article 36(3) provides that the declarations "may be made unconditionally or on
the condition of reciprocity." Statute of Int'l Ct. of Justice, June 26, 1945, art.
36, 59 Stat. 1055. The United, States initially accepted this jurisdiction in 1946
as existing without any other special agreement and in relation to any other
state accepting the same obligation. The United States, however, made the
following reservations:
Provided, that this declaration shall not apply to-
(a) disputes the solution of which the parties shall entrust to other
tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be
concluded in the future; or
(b) disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by
the United States of America; or
(c) disputes arising under a multilateral treaty unless (1) all parties to
the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the
Court, or (2) the United States of America specially agrees to the
jurisdiction.
Id.; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities, (Nicaragua v. United States),
1984 I.C.J. 392 (Order on Jurisdiction and Admissibility). When the ICJ
rejected the American claim that the court lacked jurisdiction, the United States
withdrew from the proceedings and withdrew its consent to Article 36(2)
compulsory jurisdiction. While the withdrawal had no effect in the Nicaragua
case, since six months notice is required to withdraw, the United States holds
to that posture today. Statement of the United States Secretary of State, 24
I.L.M. 1742 (1985).
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rather than mandatory language.25 Further, even if the Breard
and LaGrande orders were not binding, they were urgent
requests that implicated respect for the jurisdiction of the ICJ.
Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter wrote, if the courts are looking
internationally for guidance then the ICJ "would [be] a fine place
to look."
226
It is difficult to define the relationship between American law
and international law, thus the relationship between American
courts and international and supranational courts is likewise
confusing. Although the decisions of the ICJ, by the terms of its
own statute, do not constitute binding precedent,2 7 it is the
primary court designated in the international legal order for
resolving international disputes. Accordingly, the American
courts should afford some measure of deference to the opinions
of the ICJ by recognizing the basis of the ICJ's jurisdiction.
Breard and LaGrand both involved heinous crimes coupled
with clearly guilty defendants in circumstances in which the
assistance of the foreign consulate would not have changed the
result. But these cases cannot be dismissed as cases limited by
their facts. Instead, the Court completely eliminated the
principal basis for its jurisdiction over what was the most
important part of the claims of Paraguay and Germany. Even
where the subject matter jurisdiction of a federal court must be
prescribed by Congress, the Supreme Court held, in Chambers
v. NASCO,228 that courts have inherent power to impose
sanctions where a party acts in bad faith and impairs the basis
of the Court's jurisdiction. 229 Deference should have been shown
to the ICJ's attempt to accomplish the same thing.
Consequently, we return to the model of integrative comity and
ask whether it may have resolved these issues. For integrative
225. Statute of Int'l Ct. of Justice, June 26, 1995, art. 41, 59 Stat. 1055.
Article 41 provides: 'The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers
that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be
taken to preserve the respective rights of either party." Id.
226. Slaughter, supra note 44, at 711.
227. The Statute of the ICJ, article 38(l)(d), provides that the Court may
apply judicial decisions as "subsidiary means" for the determination of
international legal rules. For a comprehensive discussion of the fact that ICJ
decisions are not viewed as binding precedents by municipal courts, see
Weisburd, supra note 175 at 882-91.
228. 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
229. Id. at 35, 41, 55, 57-58.
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comity to be mandated, the first element of the formula requires
American courts to address those decisions by which
international tribunals confront them. Both Breard and
LaGrand involved such a confrontation because the United
States Supreme Court received an Order from the ICJ that the
United States take all measures in its disposal to ensure that
the defendants avoid immediate execution. °  The second
element of the integrative comity formula is that the United
States consents to the international court's jurisdiction. This
was likely in the Breard proceedings instituted by Paraguay,
since the United States never filed an objection to jurisdiction
and it appointed an agent to represent it during the
proceedings. 231  The proceedings involving Walter LaGrand,
however, involved an ex parte order of the ICJ and there was no
express consent; but there would have been jurisdiction within
the terms of Article 36(1) and 41. Further, the United States has
not objected to jurisdiction in the proceedings that continued. 232
The final part of the test requires that international tribunals
be accorded a high degree of deference, and that American
courts aid them in the protection of their jurisdiction and
enforcement of their judgments, unless to do so would violate a
clear and express constitutional or statutory prohibition under
American law. Professor Weisburd made a thoughtful argument
that comity would not have been required in the Breard or
LaGrande matters, because the criminal processes in the United
States were complete and execution was scheduled. As he
observes:
If the Court's authority to grant a stay is limited to
situations in which the sentence to be stayed was
imposed in a judgment that the Court is likely to review,
how could it grant a stay in a case in which it had
determined that there would be no review?
233
Professor Weisburd's argument has some merit if we assume
that the United States would ignore a clear and dispositive ICJ
230. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 374 (1998); Fed. Republic of Germany
v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 111-12 (1999).
231. See generally Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
232. See generally Counter-Memorial of the United States (Germany v.
United States) (Mar. 27, 2000), available at http://www.icj-
cij .org/icjwww/idocket/iguspleadings/igus-ipleading-CounterMemorialUS-
2000327.htm.>.
233. Weisburd, supra note 175, at 927.
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ruling that nation-states may not impose criminal sentences in
the face of extreme violations of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations. The problem with Professor Weisburd's
argument is the assumption that whatever the ICJ might have
held does not matter and that by implication the ICJ is a tribunal
to be acknowledged only when convenient. With this, we return
to Louis Henkin's formula that such a lack of comity merely
indicates a reluctance to defer to that which can, as a pragmatic
political matter, can be resisted.234 The cynic might also whisper
that this is simply the reality that international courts are not
given deference and international law will be ignored where it is
in the short-term national interest to do so.
Perhaps it is unrealistic to suggest a domestic doctrine of
comity and deference to international courts, but I hope that
this is not so. In other contexts the United States has been able
to function within the jurisdictional reaches of supranational
tribunals such as the Dispute Settlement Bodies of the WTO, or
the dispute resolution procedures under NAFrA. Our friend the
cynic notes that this may be because, since America is the
unquestioned global economic leader, it is in the American
national interest to stabilize trade relationships. Yet has it not
also been the consistent hope of the United States that
international law will be observed and will temper the self
interest inherent in resolving international disputes along purely
political lines? To refuse even the modest degree of international
comity suggested here would suggest that in the dispute
between the language of law and the language of power, law is
losing ground.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE BENEFITS OF THE COOPERATIVE AND DUALIST
MODELS OF COMITY
Introducing greater clarity into the value of comity is a matter
of some urgency. The amount of transnational litigation in
American courts has been exacerbated by the fact that the
United States is viewed as a haven for foreign litigants because
of the attractiveness of its substantive law, the liberality of its
pleading and discovery procedures, and the perceived generosity
234. Professor Louis Henkin has called this the "cynic's formula." Louis
HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 49 (2d ed. 1979): see also id. at 74-76 (outlining
pragmatic reasons why nations break international law).
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of American juries.235 This does not suggest that American
courts have solicited or embraced this tendency.23 6 Questions of
comity often do not become part of the analysis. Under a model
of cooperative comity, American courts should recognize the
cooperative aspects of international judicial comity and give due
regard to their role as participants in an international scheme of
dispute resolution. This recognition requires an
acknowledgment of the presence and role of foreign courts.
Asking the questions that cooperative comity demands be asked
will also end vagueness and uncertainty about what is
influencing the court in a given case.
Finally, a posture of integrative comity will both contribute to
the effectiveness of international and supranational tribunals,
and the effectiveness of international law itself.23 7 Professor
235. See generally Smith Kline & French Laboratories, Ltd. v. Bloch, 2 All
E.R. 72, 74 (C.A. 1983). The most famous observation on this score is the first
paragraph of Lord Denning's opinion:
As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United
States. If he can only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a
fortune. At no cost to himself, and at no risk of having to pay anything
to the other side. The lawyers there will conduct the case "on spec" as
we say, or on a "contingency fee" as they say.
Id. at 74. In Smith Kline, a British litigant had filed suit in the United States,
alleging that a British subsidiary and its United States parent breached an
agreement. Id. at 75. Smith Kline successfully sought a British injunction
against prosecution of the United States action. What aroused Lord Denning's
pique was the suggestion of the British litigant that he should not be deprived,
in an action involving an American parent corporation, of American fee
arrangements, American measures of damages, and American discovery
devices. Id. at 78. The case is often cited as an example of a British failure of
comity, and Lord Denning's strong views do not continue to dominate the
English courts.
236. The concept of forum shopping is often characterized, particularly in the
context of analyzing issues under the Erie doctrine, as an "evil" to be avoided.
See, e.g., Abex Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 790 F.2d 119, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(outlining the "evils of forum shopping"); Hamilton v. Roth, 624 F.2d 1204, 1210
(3d Cir. 1980) (discussing the Erie doctrine generally); Applied Micro, Inc. v. SJ1
Fulfillment, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 750, 755 (N.D. 111. 1996) (applying the Erie
doctrine). This view has been criticized, as Friederich Juenger observed, we
should not be too quick to condemn forum shopping because it is legitimate for
lawyers to serve the needs of clients by obtaining every advantage. Friederich
Juenger, The Internationalization of Law and Legal Practice: Forum Shopping,
Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 570 (1989); see also Goad v.
Celotex, Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 512 n. 12 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that forum
shopping is not inherently evil since both diversity jurisdiction and venue
statutes are implicit approvals of affording range of forum selections).
237. One objection to an increased role for international comity is that there
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Harold Hongju Koh, for example, writing on the perennial
problem of the means of ensuring compliance with international
norms, has argued that compliance depends on "a complex
process whereby international norms seep into, are internalized,
and become embodied in domestic legal and political
processes.'238 Perhaps it can be better stated by saying that our
courts must become better international citizens.
is a limited history of effective international litigation, meaning that
enforcement and recognition of the judgments and orders of international
tribunals has been far from automatic. See generally Laurence R. Helfer &
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication,
107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997). Rather, the most notable success has been in the
area of supranational adjudication. Id. at 290-98 (outlining the successes of the
European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights).
Supranational adjudication, however, takes place in a very different context,
namely one in which the participating or member states have specifically
authorized by treaty the tribunal to exercise certain functions that otherwise
would be reserved to the member states. Id. at 276. The most successful of
these tribunal include the European Court of Justice and the European Court
of Human Rights. Id. Moreover, as Professors Helfer and Slaughter noted, the
nations that form the European Union "share a common core of social, political,
and legal values that European jurists themselves have linked to the
effectiveness of the two tribunals." Id.
238. Koh, Legal Process, supra note 176, at 205.
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